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ABSTRACT
In the EU legal system, the relationship between European and National
law has always been a fruitful and challenging terrain for discussion and
analysis. The expression “judicial dialogue” usually refers to different
channels, both formal and informal. These channels are in place in the
interchange between European Courts, including, most importantly,
Constitutional Courts and the Court of Justice of the European Union.
While the scholarly debate on judicial dialogue in the EU context is by
now quite extensive, new, interesting strands are recently developing in
the specific context of EU Banking and Financial Legislation. Going beyond
technicalities of EU Banking Law, this paper aims to show that the high
degree of innovation and experimentation of EU Banking Law is a fruitful
laboratory for the development of forms of judicial dialogue that go well
beyond preliminary reference and that offer food for thought at a broader
political and institutional level.
I. INTRODUCTION: COMPLEXITIES OF THE EU ARCHITECTURE
AND THE NEED FOR JUDICIAL DIALOGUE
In the European Union (“EU”) legal system, the relationship between
European Law and the law of each Member State has always been a fruitful
and challenging area of discussion and analysis. The unique structure of
the EU, its constitutional variety1 and complexity,2 and its distinguished
features vis-à-vis federal structures raise complex issues. One crucial issue
1. For a comprehensive overview of the notion and its interpretation overtime, see
GIUSEPPE MARTINICO & ORESTE POLLICINO, THE INTERACTION BETWEEN EUROPE’S LEGAL
SYSTEMS: JUDICIAL DIALOGUE AND THE CREATION OF SUPRANATIONAL LAWS 18 (2012)
[hereinafter M ARTINICO & P OLLICINO ] (providing a wide assessment of how the
relationship between EU and National Law is understood within Member States
by discussing common values and different approaches taken); see also J UAN A.
MAYORAL & MARLENE WIND, NATIONAL COURTS AND EU LAW: NEW ISSUES, THEORIES
AND METHODS 5 (Bruno de Witte et al. eds., 2019); FILIPPO FONTANELLI ET AL., SHAPING
RULE OF LAW THROUGH DIALOGUE: INTERNATIONAL AND SUPRANATIONAL EXPERIENCES
(2010) [hereinafter FONTANELLI].
2. See generally Giuseppe Martinico, Complexity and Cultural Sources of Law in
the EU Context: From the Multilevel Constitutionalism to the Constitutional Synallagma, 8
GER. L.J. 205 (2007).
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concerns the hierarchy between EU Law and National Constitutions: the
issue arises when the ultimate guardians of the respective legal orders—the
Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) and the National
Constitutional Courts (“NCCs”)—have conflicting views as to which
system should prevail. The supremacy of EU Law is one of the guiding
principles of the European legal order;3 but when EU Law comes at odds
with fundamental rules enshrined in the Constitutions of the Member
States, the EU edifice shows signs of instability. In this particular case,
there is a risk of short-circuiting the system.4 A way out of this legal maze
needs to be found, and the solution may be increased dialogue between
the CJEU and NCCs.
Over time there has been an increase in the “dialogue” between the
CJEU and NCCs. Until a few years ago, the expression “dialogue
between Courts” may have seemed obscure and in need of clarification
amongst scholars involved in the International and EU legal debate on the
relationship between Courts and jurisdiction. Nowadays the notion is
commonly used in legal discourse,5 but the idea of dialogue has been
expressed in different ways by different authors (formally/informally,
directly/indirectly, silently/explicitly)6 and criticized by others.7

3. The principle, codified by the CJEU in the 1960s-1970s, has undergone its own
evolution, that reflects that of the Treaties, particularly after Maastricht. See generally
MARTINICO & POLLICINO, supra note 1, at 148.
4. GIUSEPPE MARTINICO, THE TANGLED COMPLEXITY OF THE EU CONSTITUTIONAL
P ROCESS: THE F RUSTRATING KNOT OF E UROPE 21 (2012) [hereinafter THE TANGLED
COMPLEXITY OF THE EU CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS] (describes the “entanglement” and its
impact on the role of EU Courts vis-à-vis National Courts).
5. E.g., Takis Tridimas, The ECJ and the National Courts: Dialogue, Cooperation
and Instability, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF EUR. UNION L. 403, 404 (Damian Chalmers
& Anthony Arnull eds., 2015); Marta Cartabia, “Taking Dialogue Seriously” The Renewed
Need for a Judicial Dialogue at the Time of Constitutional Activism in the European
Union, Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 12/07, https://jeanmonnetprogram.org/paper/
taking-dialogue-seriously-the-renewed-need-for-a-judicial-dialogue-at-the-time-ofconstitutional-activism-in-the-european-union/ [https://perma.cc/KG77-JVZM]; Allan Rosas,
The European Court of Justice in Context: Forms and Patterns of Judicial Dialogue, 1 EUR.
J. L. STUD. 121 (2008) (discussing his belief that there are five different types of judicial
dialogue that affect the role of the CJEU).
6. Giuseppe Martinico, Judging in the Multilevel Legal Order: Exploring the
Techniques of ‘Hidden Dialogue, 21 KING’S L.J., 257, 258 (2010).
7. See Monica Claes & Maartje de Visser, Are You Networked Yet? On Dialogues in
European Judicial Networks, 8 U TRECHT L. Rev. 100, 112–13 (2012); see generally
FONTANELLI, supra note 1 (explaining the expression “dialogue” is naturally employed in
a vast array of areas, including, most significantly, international law); see also Anthony
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Looking at the EU environment, the expression “judicial dialogue”
usually refers to different channels, both formal and informal, between
European Courts, including, most importantly, Constitutional Courts and
the CJEU. While the scholarly debate on judicial dialogue in the EU
context is by now quite extensive, new and interesting forms of dialogue
have recently begun developing, specifically in the context of EU Banking
and Financial Legislation enacted as a response to the 2007-2008 financial
crisis. These new forms of dialogue have begun forming because this area
of European Legislation is a huge laboratory of new experiences that go well
beyond its (sometimes overwhelming) technicalities.
This legislation introduces new legal concepts, re -organizes the
system of Financial supervision, and moves towards an increasing level
of centralization of supervision and enforcement at the European level. It
builds a new system of Financial Supervision in the EU, sets up new
agencies (EBA, ESMA, EIOPA), and centralizes banking supervision in
the Euro area in the hands of the European Central Bank. The legislation
also touches upon fundamental rights at times, for example, when it
introduces new, pervasive sanction regimes, or when it reshapes the way
banking crises and their effects on different stakeholders are handled. New
legislation governing EU Financial Supervision and Banking resolution has
stirred a significant volume of litigation and case-law in a relatively short
time span, leading to a number of relevant precedents by the CJEU rich
in new developments. The role of the European Central Bank (“ECB”)
in discharging its monetary policy function is another area for these
developments where the main issue was the discretion and the powers
that the ECB may discharge and the limits between monetary and
economic policy, the latter reserved to Member States.8 These cases and
their impacts will be discussed in further detail in Section III.
In all of these areas of the ECB’s intervention—banking supervision
and resolution and monetary policy—EU Legislation operates as a catalyst
for innovation of EU Law. New channels for dialogue among courts are
being explored and new ways of sharing and agreeing upon common
principles are being developed, but, at the same time, new conflicts are
opening up. The impact this phenomenon might have on the debate on
judicial dialogue is clearly visible in the already burgeoning scholarly
literature surrounding these developments.
This contribution will first provide a very concise overview of how the
debate on the dialogue between EU Courts developed overtime, paying
Arnull, Judicial Dialogue in the European Union, in P HILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
EUROPEAN UNION LAW 133 (Julie Dickinson & Pavlos Eleftheriadis eds., 2012).
8. Case C-493/17, Weiss and Others v. Bundesregierung, ECLI:EU:C:2018:1000,
¶ 16 (Dec. 11, 2018).
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particular attention to its most “formal” and (at least until recently)
innovative strand, represented by using the proceedings for preliminary
reference to the CJEU initiated by NCCs (Section I). It will then expose
in greater detail how judicial dialogue recently evolved specifically, and
with singularities, in the area of the new EU Banking legislation, by
considering some relevant, seminal cases (Section II). Finally, it will draw
some preliminary conclusions (Section III).
II. PRELIMINARY REFERENCE BY NCCS: FROM INNOVATION TO
CONSOLIDATION
Over the past few years, the “dialogue” between EU Constitutional
Courts and the CJEU has increasingly relied upon the reference for
preliminary ruling mechanism laid out in Article 267 of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”).9 As will be discussed in
Section III, the use of the preliminary reference in the context of EU
Banking legislation has generated unique judicial precedents, including
Gauweiler and Weiss, that are contributing innovative solutions to the
legal debate surrounding judicial dialogue.
Preliminary references allow National Courts of all jurisdictions to
submit questions to the CJEU regarding the interpretation of EU legislation
that may arise from cases under their scrutiny. 10 As mandated by the
guiding principle of supremacy of EU Law, National Courts are subject
to CJEU’s authority and, thus, expected to comply with its decisions
which hold the force of res judicata.11 In the context of EU Banking
legislation, preliminary reference may serve as an important tool to
clarify the extreme complexities and technicalities of the law, providing
innovative approaches that raise unprecedented interpretative issues. The
preliminary ruling mechanism may offer a straightforward and simple
way of handling possible conflicts between EU and National law, but it
has several drawbacks including its limited scope and the fact that if
National Courts may address the CJEU and submit to it a question
concerning the interpretation or the validity of EU Law, the CJEU may
not submit to National Courts questions involving the interpretation or
9. Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 267, Sept. 05, 2008, 2008
O.J. (C 202) 1.
10. Court of Justice of European Union (CJEU), EUR. UNION, https://europa.eu/
european-union/about-eu/institutions-bodies/court-justice_en) [https://perma.cc/3U92-CHX9].
11. Id.
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validity of National Law. Another evident of these drawbacks emerged in
the Weiss case where the court found that National Courts must be, in
principle, ready to abide to and comply with the principle of supremacy.12
Resorting to preliminary references by NCCs is a recent practice that
has gradually spread, and ultimately, found new terrain for development
in the context of EU Banking legislation. There is extensive literature on
the evolution of preliminary reference usage by NCCs, so for our purposes it
therefore suffices to sketch out only some its fundamental traits. During a
period of EU Law which spanned largely from 1964 to the early 1980s,
tensions between NCCs and the CJEU arose as the former sought to
impose limits to the supremacy of EU Law and the binding value of the
CJEU’s judgments. The Italian and German systems initially found that
decisions issued by the CJEU that infringe fundamental principles protected
under National constitutional law, or exceed the powers transferred to it by
the Treaties, would not be applicable in their domestic legal order despite the
superiority of the CJEU. These ideas came into play at an EU judicial level
with the Frontini13 decision of the Italian Corte Costituzionale in 1973 and
with the famous Solange I (1974)14 and Solange II (1986)15 decisions of the
German Bundesverfassungsgericht “BVerfG” which forged the “counterlimits doctrines.”16 Other cases where National Courts made similar decisions
include the Granital 17 decision by the Italian Corte Costituzionale
(1984), the Grogan18 decision of the Irish Supreme Court (1989) and the
Carlsen19 decision of the Danish Supreme Court (1998). More recently,
further decisions of the French Conseil Constitutionel,20 the Spanish

12. Case C-493/17, Weiss and Others v. Bundesregierung, ECLI:EU:C:2018:1000,
¶ 16 (Dec. 11, 2018).
13. Corte cost., 18 dicembre 1973, Gazz. Uff. 1974, 183 (It.).
14. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] May 29,
1974 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts 37, 271 (Ger.).
15. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Oct. 22,
1986 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts 37, 271 (Ger.).
16. Ancora su diritto comunitario e diritto interno, in Studi per il XX anniversario
dell’Assemblea costituente. Autonomie e garanzie costituzionali 45 (1969) (dicsussing, in
Italian, “controlimiti;” this term was introduced by P. Barile).
17. Corte cost., 6 maggio 1984, Gazz. Uff. 1984, 170 (It.); Corte cost., 21 aprile
1989, Gazz. Uff. 1989 (It.) (where the same doctrine was used in the Fragd case).
18. Hanne Norup Carlsen et al. v. Prime Minister of Denmark, 6 April 1998, Ugeskrift
for Retsvaesen H 800, 3 C.M.L.R. 854 (Den.).
19. Society for the Protection of Unborn Children (Ireland) Ltd v. Grogan [1989]
IR 753 (Ir.).
20. Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [constitutional council], June 10, 2004, 2004-496DC
(Fr.); Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [constitutional council], July 1, 2004, 2004-497DC
(Fr.); Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [constitutional council], July 29, 2004, 2004-499DC
(Fr.); Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [constitutional council], Nov. 19, 2004, 2004-505DC
(Fr.).
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Tribunal Constitucional21 and of Czech22 and Polish23 courts reflect the
gradual diffusion of the doctrine across Europe. In such decisions,
National Courts tried to challenge the principle of supremacy of EU Law
when it involved measures that could collide with basic principles of their
internal constitutional system.
The results achieved in the cases cited above may provide a broad
account for the fact that NCCs originally refrained from directly using the
preliminary reference procedure under Article 267 of the TFEU, refraining
from referring any questions to the CJEU. Notwithstanding these
resistances towards the principle of supremacy of EU Law in the earlier
years of the EU legal order, dialogues between National and European
courts became increasingly frequent and generally favorable to the
development of a common institutional and legal framework. As a
consequence, it was only during the last decade that the posture of NCCs
towards the use of preliminary references became more and more
customary by Supreme Courts of the Union, thus gradually opening up a
new formal channel of EU inter-judicial constitutional dialogue.
In the context of the new architecture of EU Banking and Financial
Legislation, which was redrafted and applied after the financial crisis of
2007-08, preliminary reference was tested soon after enactment as a
consequence of the procedural and substantial law complexities of the
legislation. Gauweiler, in 2014, was the first attempt by the German
Constitutional Court to resort to preliminary reference.24 Not by chance,
Gauweiler was a case that involved complex issues of interpretation of
the mandate of the European Central Bank in discharging its monetary
policy functions.25
A. New Approaches to the Use of Preliminary Reference
Within the EU, there are currently seventeen Member States with
established Constitutional Courts responsible for carrying out ad hoc
constitutional review of legislation and broadly structured out of the

21. S.T.C. Declaración 1/2004, Dec. 13, 2004 (Spain).
22. Ústavni Soud, Pl. (ÚS) [Decision of the Constitutional Court of May 3, 2006],
sp.zn., ÚS 66/04 (Czech).
23. No 0 1/05, Judgment, ¶ 2 (Trybunal konstytucyjny Apr. 27, 2005).
24. See Case C-62/14, Gauweiler and others v. Deutscher Bundestag, ECLI:EU:
C:2015:400, ¶ 127 (June 16, 2016).
25. Id.
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judicial branch.26 Only roughly half of such courts have so far submitted
preliminary references to the CJEU,27 namely those from Austria, 28
Belgium,29 France,30 Germany, Italy, Lithuania, 31 Poland,32 Slovenia,33
and Spain.34 Moreover, supreme courts that have jurisdiction to conduct
constitutional review, or to substantially perform a similar review; the
Irish High Court, the Danish Hojesteret, the Estonian Riigikohus, the
Romanian Constitutional Court,35 and the Dutch Hoge Raad all hold the
tradition of making use of the preliminary reference mechanism addressed to
the CJEU.36
In this development of preliminary reference usage, the Italian and the
German Courts stand out for their “activism” in this field. For most of its
history, the Italian Corte Costituzionale’s involvement in EU matters was
limited to the context of incidenter proceedings, under which the court is
called by an ordinary judge to incidentally rule on the constitutional
compatibility of the legislation relevant to a certain case, without the
need to formally address the CJEU.37 The Court referred its first request

26. Victor Ferreres Comella, The European Model of Constitutional Review of
Legislation: Toward Decentralization?, 2 INT’L J. OF CONST. L., 461, 461–63 (2004).
27. See Maria Dicosola et al., Foreword: Constitutional Courts in the European
Legal System After the Treaty of Lisbon and the Euro-Crisis, 16 GER. L.J. 1317, 1318
(2015).
28. See, e.g., Case C-409/99, Metropol Treuhand WirtschaftsstreuhandgmbH,
2002 E.C.R. I-00081. Austria first referred a preliminary question in 1999 and is the
second most active constitutional court in relation to this instrument.
29. See, e.g., Case C-93/97, Fédération Belge des Chambres Syndicales de Médecins
ASBL 1998 E.R.C. I-4855. The Belgian Cour d’arbitrage, which acts as a constitutional
court, was the first court to make reference to the CJEU and is until today the most regular user
of the procedure. Its first case was submitted in 1997, with Case C-93/97.
30. See, e.g., Case C-168/13 PPU, Jeremy F. v. Premier ministre, ECLI:EU:C:
2013:358 (May 30, 2013).
31. See, e.g., Case C-2/18 Lietuvos Respublikos Seimo narių grupė v. Lietuvos
Respublikos Seimas ECLI:EU:C:2019:962 (Nov. 13, 2019).
32. See, e.g., Case C-390/15, Rzecznik Praw Obywatelskich (RPO), ECLI:EU:C:
2017:174 (Mar. 27, 2017).
33. See, e.g., Case C-526/14, Kotnik and others v. Državni zbor Republike Slovenije
ECLI:EU:C:2016:102 (Feb. 18, 2016).
34. See, e.g., Case C-399/11, Stefano Melloni v. Ministerio Fiscal, ECLI:EU:C:
2013:107 (Feb. 26, 2013).
35. See e.g., Case C-673/16, Relu Adrian Coman v. Inspectoratul General pentru
Imigrări, Ministerul Afacerilor Interne, ECLI:EU:C:2018:385 (June 5, 2018) (concerning
freedom of movement and same-sex marriages in the EU, raised by the Romanian Court
in front of the CJEU).
36. Monica Claes, Here We Come? Constitutional Courts and the Preliminary Reference
Procedure, 16 GER. L.J. 1331, 1332 (2015).
37. Filippo Fontanelli & Giuseppe Martinico, Cooperative Antagonists - The Italian
Constitutional Court and the Preliminary Reference: Are We Dealing with a Turning Point?
(Eric Stein Working Paper, Paper No. 5/2008, 2008), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1299280.
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for a preliminary ruling to the CJEU in 2008.38 Cases 102/2008 and 103/
2008 mark the first time that the Corte Costituzionale referred a question
to the CJEU.39 These two cases originated from a principaliter proceeding
which consisted of an action before the court seeking judicial review
of governmental acts vis-à-vis Constitutional principles.40 Apart from
constitutional law claims, the challenges in these cases were based on various
Treaty provisions, yet still quite timidly, the Court only submitted
questions not covered for what was understood as already falling under
the acte clair doctrine which states that when a certain provision is clear,
there is no duty for a member state to refer a question for preliminary
ruling.41 Preliminary reference was once again used by the Corte Costituzionale
in the Mascolo case,42 in Taricco I,43 and in M.A.S. e M.B. (known as
Taricco II).44 These did not involve the application of EU Banking or
Financial legislation, however, they provide the background for further
developments, especially concerning the relationship between EU Law
and National Constitutional Law that, as will be discussed, are particularly
relevant for some of the last ground-breaking developments in Germany
by the BVerfG.
The impact of EU Banking and Financial Legislation on the attitude of
the German Constitutional Court towards preliminary reference has
proven to be paramount. In the past, the German Court showed its general
uneasiness with European treaties through its rulings, such as in the
Solange45 judgments, and in the famous Maastricht46 and Lisbon47 cases.
In these cases, there emerged the increasing relevance of National

38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Case C-283/81 Srl CILFIT v. Ministry of Health, ECLI:EU:C:1982:335 (Oct.
6, 1982).
42. Case C-418/13, Mascolo v. Ministero dell’Istruzione, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2401,
(Nov. 26, 2014).
43. Case C-105/14, In re Taricco and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2015:555, (Sept. 8, 2015).
44. C-42/17, In re M.A.S. and M.B., ECLI:EU:C:2017:936, (Dec. 5, 2017).
45. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], May 29,
1974, Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts 37, 271 (Ger.); Bundesverfassungsgericht
[BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], Oct. 22, 1986, Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts 37, 271 (Ger.).
46. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], Oct. 12,
1993, 89 Entscheidungen Des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 155 (Ger.).
47. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], June 30,
2009, 123 Entscheidungen Des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 267 (Ger.).
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Constitutional principles as limits to the full expansion of the principle of
supremacy of EU Law. Since the European Union is grounded and
rooted in the Constitution of Member States, EU Law may not entirely
overrule their Constitutional identity. These decisions were made by the
BVerfG without any recourse to the CJEU’s preliminary judgement and
they gradually showed that the principle of supremacy of EU Law over
the law of the Member States is not without exceptions when it comes to
confronting National Constitutions and their fundamental principles.
The German Court’s first reference under Article 267 of the TFEU
occurred only in 2014 in the Gauweiler case, when the court deviated from
its historically dialectic attitude towards the CJEU.48 A similar approach
towards preliminary references can be seen by the Polish Constitutional
Court, which stated in 2005 that if it eventually decided to refer a
question to the CJEU, it would do so only in cases where the application
of EU Law would be strictly necessary.49 The posture of the court changed
significantly ten years later with Case C-390/15 (RPO), when the Polish
Constitutional Court submitted its first preliminary reference.50 All of
such cases seem to indicate a trend that has gained strength in the beginning
of the last decade, bringing NCCs to a closer dialogue with the CJEU by
resorting to preliminary references.
Despite the relatively recent history of the use of preliminary references by
NCCs, its evolution is underpinned almost from its beginning by the
counter-limits doctrine, most recently marking its apex in the Weiss
case51 concerning the European Central Bank. This is also seen in the
Carlsen decision of the Danish Supreme Court, wherein the Court stated
that, if there is a doubt on the compatibility of a European Act with the
Danish Constitution, it may raise the question to the CJEU and request for
clarification.52 Should the CJEU fail to convince the national judges of the
compatibility, the National Court would be authorized to apply the
counter-limits doctrine.53 In other words, although the Danish court accepted
the preliminary reference mechanism, it introduced a carve-out so as to be

48. Case C-62/14, Gauweiler and Others v. Deutscher Bundestag, ECLI:EU:C:2015:
400, ¶¶ 1–2 (June 16, 2015).
49. Poland’s Membership in the European Union (The Accession Treaty), K 18/04,
Judgment, ¶ 18 (May 11, 2005).
50. Case C-390/15, Rzecznik Praw Obywatelskich (RPO), ECLI:EU:C:2017:174
¶¶ 2, 54, 71 (Mar. 7, 2017).
51. Case C-493/17, In re Weiss and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2018:1000 ¶¶ 1–2 (Dec.
11, 2018).
52. Carlsen and others v. Prime Minister Poul Nyrup Rasmussen (Danish Supreme
Court), 3 C.M.L.R. 854 (Apr. 6, 1998).
53. Id.
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able to keep the final word. 54 A similar approach was followed by the
Danish Constitutional Court in 2017 in the Ajos case.55 The German BVerfG
also resorted to the same logic already in its first preliminary reference
case Gauweiler.56 The Italian Constitutional Court resorted to a similar
approach in Taricco II, raising explicit questions to the CJEU on the
applicability of the counter-limits doctrine in the event of clash between
national and EU provisions.57 These examples illustrate a certain fragility in
the relationship between the CJEU and NCCs when it comes to the
dynamics of EU Law and preliminary references.
Recent developments in the EU Banking and Legislation field, represented
by the Weiss case, are a clear demonstration of the clash between the
preliminary reference mechanism and the counter-limits doctrine.58 In
effect, the success of preliminary ruling as a tool for an effective judicial
coordination will ultimately depend on the willingness of NCCs to elaborate
the counter-limits doctrines and to openly engage in dialogue with the
CJEU. To this extent, other high-level courts (i.e., non-constitutional in
nature but highly ranked in their domestic system) have proved to be much
more active and collaborative in the EU institutional dialogue than NCCs;
some of the most important cases in this area concern certain aspects of
EU Banking and Financial Legislation. Reference can be made to a
significant number of preliminary rulings filed by superior courts of
different Member States, that testify to a large and increasing number of
cases before the CJEU.59 Within the field of banking and financial law,
the number is far from inexpressive.
Interestingly, the advent of EU banking legislation coincides with the
period of intensification of the use of preliminary reference procedures by

54. Id.
55. Case C-441/14, Dansk Industri ex rel. Ajos v. Estate of Rasmussen,
ECLI:EU:C:2016:278 (Apr. 19, 2016); see Helle Krunke & Sune Klinge, The Danish Ajos
Case: The Missing Case from Maastricht and Lisbon, 3 EUR. PAPERS 157, 160–61 (2018).
56. Case C-62/14, Gauweiler and Others v. Deutscher Bundestag, ECLI:EU:C:
2015:400, ¶¶ 1–2 (June 16, 2015).
57. Case C-42/17, M.A.S. and M.B., ECLI:EU:C:2017:936, ¶¶ 1, 13, 172–75 (Dec. 5,
2017).
58. See, Case C-493/17, Weiss and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2018:1000, ¶¶ 13–15 (Dec.
11, 2018).
59. Category Archives: EU Banking and Financial Law, EU CASE LAW (Nov. 5,
2019), http://www.eucaselaw.com/category/eu-banking-financial-law/ [https://perma.cc/
9A4A-ZLWA].
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National Courts. Only over the last few years, the French Conseil d’État,60
the Italian Consiglio di Stato,61 the Austrian Bundesverwaltungsgericht62
and the German Budesverwaltungsgericht63 have referred questions to the
CJEU concerning matters of interpretation and validity of EU banking
legislation. Case C-911/19 (FBF v. ACPR), for example, was a request
for a preliminary ruling referred by the Conseil d’État concerning
guidelines on product oversight and governance arrangements for retail
banking products, issued by the European Banking Authority (“EBA”).64
The judgment rendered by the Court on July 15, 2021 is destined to
attract academic interest for its questions involving the nature of soft law
issued by EU Authorities (guidelines, Q&As), and limits as to the powers
vested upon the EBAmon grounds of the ultra vires doctrine, a theory
already invoked by NCCs in earlier cases.65 It will have spill-over effects
in other fields of EU legislation, well beyond the boundaries of banking
or financial regulation and supervision.66
Case 686/18 (Adusbef and Others) involves a request for a preliminary
ruling, which is still pending, from the Italian Consiglio di Stato.67 The
questions submitted by the Italian court concern the preclusion of national
provisions on prudential matters, in light of the pre-existing EU regulations
on such topics. In a previous case recently submitted by the Consiglio di
Stato, Case C-594/16 (Buccioni), regarding professional secrecy, the CJEU’s
judgment offered a holistic approach to financial services supervision,
carrying out a parallel interpretation of the Markets in Financial Instruments
Directive I (“MiFID I”) and the Capital Requirements Directive IV (“CRD
60. See, e.g., Case C-911/19, FBF v. ACPR, ECLI:EU:C:2021:294, ¶ 2 (July 15,
2021).
61. See, e.g., Case C-686/18, Adusbef and Others v. Banca d’Italia and Others,
ECLI:EU:C:2020:567, ¶¶ 67, 69 (July 16, 2020); Case C-594/16, Buccioni v. Banca d’Italia,
ECLI:EU:C:2018:717, ¶¶ 19, 21–23 (Sept. 13, 2018).
62. See, e.g., Case C-52/17, VTB Bank AG v. Österreichisch Finanzmarktaufsicht,
ECLI:EU:C:2018:648, ¶¶ 1–2 (Feb. 1, 2017); see generally, See Raffaele D’Ambrosio,
The Liability of the ECB and NCAs Within the Single Supervisory Mechanism, 78
QUADERNI DI RICERCA GIURIDICA DELLA CONSULENZA LEGALE BANCA D’ITALIA (2015)
https://www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/quaderni-giuridici/2015-0078/index.html?com.
dotmarketing.htmlpage.language=1 [https://perma.cc/5SGA-CFAF].
63. See, e.g., Case C-15/16, Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht v.
Baumeister, ECLI:EU:C:2018:464, ¶ 1 (June 19, 2018).
64. Case C-911/19, FBF v. ACPR, ECLI:EU:C:2021:294, ¶ 2 (July 15, 2021).
65. E.g., BVerfG, 2 BvR 859/15, May 5, 2020, https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/
SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/EN/2020/05/rs20200505_2bvr085915en.html [https://perma.cc/
E9K8-TCQ4].
66. On the expanding force of soft law in the EU and on its National application,
see Emilia Korkea-aho et al., EU Soft Law in the Member States (Mariolina Eliantoni et al.
eds., vol. 8 2021).
67. Case C-686/18, Adusbef and Others v. Banca d’Italia and Others, ECLI:EU:C:
2020:567, ¶¶ 67, 69 (July 16, 2020).
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IV”) on the treatment and access to confidential information.68 This case
drew upon recently developed case law, including Altmann.69 As a result,
in Buccioni, the CJEU granted significant discretionary powers to both
supervisory authorities and National Courts in balancing the complex
network of interests involved in the disclosure of information by financial
supervisors.70 New opportunities for dialogue between the Italian Consiglio
di Stato and the CJEU have arisen from the famous Case C-219/17 (Silvio
Berlusconi and Fininvest v. Banca d’Italia), a milestone case that defined
the concept of “single judicial review” for national draft decisions preceding
a final ECB decision within the framework of the SSM.71 In conjunction
with the abovementioned Austrian VTB Bank case, the Berlusconi case
marks the second preliminary reference on the sensitive issue of the
delimitation of the ECB’s competence vis-à-vis those invested upon national
authorities,72 whose aftermaths also prompted an official statement by the
ECB in a letter sent to all supervised banks.73
B. Reactions by the CJEU
Several hints can be gathered by considering the CJEU’s reactions to
the tensions that result from the process described above. The CJEU has
indeed refined a wide array of techniques and methods to address the
preliminary ruling mechanism to obtain what, from its perspective, is the
most effective result.74 Especially towards NCCs, the CJEU often takes
an open dialogue attitude, designing its answers and tone to avoid direct
confrontation and opposition. This is clear in the Taricco saga where the
68. For more on the subject, see René Smits & Nikolai Badenhoop, Towards a
Single Standard of Professional Secrecy for Financial Sector Supervisory Authorities: A
Reform Proposal, 44 EUR. L. REV. 295, 295 (2019).
69. Case C-140/13, Altmann v. Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht,
ECLI:EU:C:2014:2168, ¶ 61 (Sept. 4, 2014).
70. Case C-594/16, Buccioni v. Banca d’Italia, ECLI:EU:C:2018:717 (Sept. 13, 2018).
71. Case C‑219/17 Silvio Berlusconi and Fininvest v. Banca d’Italia, ECLI:EU:
C:2018:1023 (Dec. 19, 2018).
72. See Lena Boucon & Daniela Jaros, The Application of National Law by the
European Central Bank within the EU Banking Union’s Single Supervisory Mechanism:
A New Mode of European Integration?, 10 EUR. J. LEGAL STUD. 155 (2018).
73. Letter from Petra Senkovic, Secretariat to the Supervisory Board, to European
Central Bank Public (Mar. 31, 2017) (on file with European Central Bank Banking
Supervision).
74. Simas Grigonis, Jurisdictional Interaction Between the CJEU and International
Dispute Settlement Bodies: EU Law Perspective 14 (Feb. 22, 2019) (Ph.D. dissertation,
Mykolas Romeris University) (on file with the MRU Institutional Repository).
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Court masterfully reformulated the terms set forth by the Italian
Constitutional Court’s questions on the application of counter-limits so as
to discuss, conversely, “common constitutional values,”75 in a nitid attempt for
a fraternal rapprochement between courts.
Another technique used to address the preliminary ruling mechanism,
also seen in Taricco but common to other cases,76 is to refrain from explicitly
answering questions referred by NCCs, either by bluntly ignoring them or
by arguing their answer is unnecessary. By limiting its analysis to the most
unavoidable questions, the CJEU frequently dribbles polemic points that
could cause frictions with NCCs, as can be seen in the judgments on
Gauweiler and Weiss.
Finally, the disseminations of suggestions or hints by the CJEU throughout
its judgements are used to induce National Courts to find a solution that
avoids direct clashes between EU Law and National Law, namely its
fundamental Constitutional principles. Once again, matters involving EU
Banking and Financial Legislation provide quite interesting examples of
the dialectic approach of the Court. For example, in Gauweiler and Weiss,
the CJEU sought to hand over arguments to the BVerfG to allow it to
come to a positive and constructive conclusion, offering certain “hooks”
that the National Court could then take into its hands to reach a nonconflicting decision while at the same time avoiding its own debacle.77
Through these techniques, the CJEU is providing a sort of pedagogical
function in favor of NCCs that it is then in the hands of the NCCs to
further develop and apply within their own system. The masterful use of
the supremacy doctrine by the CJEU, by way of flexibility, re-interpretation,
and proper wording of the judgement rendered, is one of the most
fascinating aspects of the way through which the Court is conducting the
formal dialogue with NCCs and other courts in the context of preliminary
reference. EU Banking Legislation is providing some striking examples
of how the system is evolving in these respects.
III. THE PECULIAR PATHS OF EU BANKING LEGISLATION
In the context of EU Legislation that touches upon the role of the ECB,
the dialogue between the CJEU and National Courts is evolving in multiple
different ways, some of which are quite unique, notwithstanding the fact
that most of the relevant EU Banking legislation is less than ten years old.
75. Case C-105/14, Ivo Taricco and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2015:293, ¶ 113 (Apr. 30,
2015).
76. See, e.g., Case C-418/13, Mascolo v. Ministero dell’Istruzione, dell’Università
e della Ricerca and Comune di Napoli, ECLI:EU:C:2014:240, ¶ 46 (Nov. 26, 2014).
77. Case C-493/17, Weiss v. Deutsche Bundesbank, ECLI:EU:C:2018:1000, Dec.
11, 2018.
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There is already a high level of judicial activity in this area which is
producing a comprehensive and quickly growing body of jurisprudence.78
Considering dialogue among EU Courts, four basic strands can be observed:
(1) the first, which is common to other areas of EU Law, is the recourse
to the procedure of preliminary reference by NCCs, with a constructive
approach (Gauweiler); (2) the second is the recourse to preliminary reference,
with an unexpected and unprecedented de-constructive approach (Weiss);
(3) the third is the development of informal dialogues between Courts,
with some new, peculiar features (Landeskreditbank and Banking Union);
(4) the fourth is the dialogue that might specifically develop in the context
of the application of Article 4(3) of EU Regulation 1024/2013 (“SSMR”)79
which will be truly innovative a quite problematic area of EU Banking
Legislation.80
The majority of the details of these cases have already been the object
of extensive commentaries and doctrinal contributions, so this article will
focus on the points most relevant to present the current state of the legal
discourse, and the contribution that this fast-developing body of jurisprudence
can provide to the scholarly and legal debate on judicial dialogue among
EU Courts.
A. Preliminary Reference as a Form of Constructive
Dialogue: Gauweiler
In the context of EU Banking Legislation, particularly in relation to the
ECB’s monetary functions, Gauweiler was the first case where the BVerfG

78. For a regularly updated catalogue of EU Jurisprudence in this field reference
organized by the European Banking Institute and under the direction of René Smits, see
The Banking Union and Union Courts: Overview of Cases, EUROPEAN BANKING INST.,
https://ebi-europa.eu/publications/eu-cases-or-jurisprudence/ [https://perma.cc/E9CD-29PS];
see also THE TANGLED COMPLEXITY OF THE EU CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS, supra note 4,
at 193.
79. Daniel Sarmiento & J.H.H. Weiler, The EU Judiciary After Weiss – Proposing
A New Mixed Chamber of the Court of Justice: A Position Paper (June 2, 2020), http://
www.iconnectblog.com/2020/06/the-eu-judiciary-after-weiss-proposing-a-new-mixedchamber-of-the-court-of-justice-a-position-paper/.
80. Financial Stability Review, EUROPEAN CENT. BANK 115 (Nov. 2013), https://
www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/fsr/art/ecs.fsrart20131101.en.pdf?a934bae80a276c2933ff29
4b7056fbe4 [https://perma.cc/K56D-HNQQ].
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filed a request to the CJEU for a preliminary judgement.81 For the BVerfG,
this was the first attempt ever to resort to preliminary reference.82 The case
originated from the announcement released on September 6, 2012, with
which the ECB declared its intention to start the so-called “OMT programme”
in the midst of the global financial crisis.83 Such an announcement was
marked by Mario Draghi’s famous words “whatever it takes” which was
stated in defense of the euro currency.84 The aim of the programme, which
was never actually implemented, was to respond to the worsening of the
sovereign debt crisis, characterized by strong volatility of interest rates
and obstacles that the ECB was facing in the proper transmission of its
monetary policy impulses.85
In Germany, a group of people led by Peter Gauweiler shared the
opinion that the ECB’s decision (recte, the ECB’s announcement of the
forthcoming decision) went beyond the powers conferred upon it by the
Treaty.86 According to this group, the OMT programme would likely produce
effects in the realm of economic policy well beyond the boundaries of
monetary policy.87 A further concern was that the OMT programme might
result in a breach of the prohibition on monetary financing of the budget
of Member States.88 They worried these issues would ultimately result in
a violation of a number of fundamental principles of the German Constitution,
which Germany implemented and confirmed upon joining the European

81. Alicia Hinarejos, Gauweiler and the Outright Monetary Transactions Programme:
The Mandate of the European Central Bank and the Changing Nature of Economic and
Monetary Union, 11 EUR. CONST. L. REV. 563 (2015).
82. Takis Tridimas & Napoleon Xanthoulis, A Legal Analysis of the Gauweiler
Case: Between Monetary Policy and Constitutional Conflict, 23 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. AND
COMPAR. L. 1, 17–39 (2016).
83. Technical features of Outright Monetary Transactions, ECB (Sept. 6, 2012),
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2012/html/pr120906_1.en.html [https://perma.cc/
JY43-Q8YR].
84. Verbatim of the Remarks Made by Mario Draghi: Speech by Mario Draghi,
President of the European Central Bank at the Global Investment Conference in London
26 July 2012, EUR. CENT. BANK, https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2012/html/
sp120726.en.html [https://perma.cc/44SD-UXVB].
85. The essential features of these conditions can be summarized as follows: the
purchases had to keep the monetary base unchanged; the purchases were to be limited to
medium-short term securities (one to three years); the purchases remained subordinated to
the accession of the Member State affected from time to time by purchases to a
“macroeconomic stabilization” plan within the framework of the ESM. See Case C-62/14,
Gauweiler and Others v. Deutscher Bundestag, ECLI:EU:C:2015:400 (June 16, 2015).
86. See, e.g., Helmut Siekmann, The Asset Purchase Programmes of the ESCB –
An Interdisciplinary Evaluation, 134 IMFS WORKING PAPER SERIES, 30-31, https://www.
econstor.eu/handle/10419/200104 [https://perma.cc/F9YC-CYSS].
87. Id.
88. Case C-62/14, Gauweiler and Others v. Deutscher Bundestag, ECLI:EU:C:
2015:400 (June 16, 2015).

36

ANNUNZIATA.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

[VOL. 23: 21, 2021]

1/24/2022 11:48 AM

The Role of EU Banking Legislation
SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J.

Union. The issues recalled similar concerns of the protection of National
Constitutional identity already discussed in previous preliminary references
cases raised by other NCCs including the famous Italian case Taricco,
albeit in different areas of EU Legislation.89 Gauweiler was also noteworthy
because what the CJEU reviewed was a mere press release from the ECB,
and not an actual decision of the ECB itself, differentiating it from the
renewed decision of the later Weiss case on the Public Sector Purchase
Program (“PSPP”).90 The CJEU rendered its judgement in favor of the
ECB, upholding its independence in pursuing the monetary policy objectives
assigned by the Treaty, and acknowledging, at the same time, wide flexibility
regarding the instruments that can be used to attain these purposes.91 After
the ruling of the CJEU, the matter of the OMT programme returned to the
BVerfG which finally rejected the appeals against the programme.92
The decision of the BVerfG in Gauweiler marked an important chapter
in the long evolution of the jurisprudence of the judges of Karlsruhe
regarding the relationship between EU Law and the cornerstones of the
German Constitution; Gauweiler soon became a leading case, stimulating
conspicuous commentaries and an impressive amount of scholarly literature.93
In its decision, the BVerfG started from the express recognition of the
primacy of EU Law, to which National Law is subordinated in all respects,
including, in principle, constitutional law.94 However, following a line of
reasoning inaugurated long before the Court in Karlsruhe with Solange I,
the supremacy of EU Law is valid only to the extent that its application
entails a transfer of sovereignty in accordance with the principle of
conferral and internal laws providing the authorization for the ratification
of the EU Treaties, and is within the limits of what would not compromise

89. On Taricco and the counter-limits doctrine as interpreted and applied in Italy,
see MARTINICO & POLLICINO, supra note 1, at 87.
90. BVerfG, Dec. 11, 2018, Case C-493/17, Curia (Ger.) [https://perma.cc/5N4UJ8LT].
91. Case C-62/14, Gauweiler and Others v. Deutscher Bundestag, ECLI:EU:C:
2015:400 (June 16, 2015); see Tridimas & Xanthoulis, supra note 82; Hinarejos, supra
note 81.
92. Constitutional Complaints and Organstreit Proceedings Against the OMT
Programme of the European Central Bank Unsuccessful, BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT
(June 21, 2016), https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/
EN/2016/bvg16-034.html [https://perma.cc/3N32-XB3Z].
93. See, Tridimas & Xanthoulis, supra note 82.
94. Case C-62/14, Gauweiler and Others v. Deutscher Bundestag, ECLI:EU:C:
2015:400 (June 16, 2015).
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the German constitutional identity (the “counter-limits doctrine”).95 Both
the proper application of the principle of conferral envisaged by Article 5
of the Treaty on the European Union (“TEU”), and compliance with
internal constitutional counter-limits, function as barriers to the full,
unconditional unfolding of the principle of supremacy of EU Law.96 The
result is that the EU order ends up supporting itself in the Constitutional
order of the Member States, where it finds its roots, but also its limits.97
Because these are fundamental constitutional safeguards, against which
EU Law should be set back, it is up to the BVerfG to ensure compliance
with them insofar as the German State is concerned.98 To this end, the
BVerfG has two tools: (1) the “constitutional identity” control, and (2) the
ultra-vires control. Both are based on the so-called “eternity clause” carved
into Article 79, Section III of the German Constitution (Grundgesetz –
GG)99 even though the tools are not identical in nature. The first of these
95. Id. For a definition of the counter-limits doctrine, see Giuseppe Martinico, Is
the European Convention Going to Be ‘Supreme’? A Comparative-Constitutional Overview of
ECHR and EU Law Before National Courts, 23 EUR. J. INT’L. L. 401, 419 (2012) (“By
‘counter-limits’ (controlimiti) I mean those national fundamental principles raised by
Constitutional Courts—like impenetrable barriers—against the infiltration of EU Law.
The counter-limits are conceived as a form of ‘contrepoids au pouvoir communautaire’,
an ultimate wall in the way of the full application of EU law, an intangible core of national
constitutional sovereignty”); see also Theodore Georgopoulos, The “Checks and Balances”
Doctrine in Member States as a Rule of EC Law: The cases of France and Germany, 9
E UR. L.J. 530 (2003) (providing further details on the application of th e counter-limits
doctrine by National Courts).
96. All of these arguments reflect a long evolution of the BVerfG’s case law: the
constitutional identity of the German State set out by the Grundgesetz (Article 79, Section
III) acts as a limit to EU Law as expressly referred to in Article 23. Article 23 refers back
to Article 20, which establishes the democratic principle as the fundamental principle of
the German legal system. In turn, the democratic principle is to be read in close relation
with the right to vote, guaranteed by Article 38: ultimately, this is aimed at preserving the
“individual right to democracy,” which is anchored to the protection of human dignity (the
ultimate reason for the principle of democracy). For access to German Basic Law see
Grundgesetz [GG] [Basic Law], translation at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch
_gg/index.html.
97. For further reflections, see Luis Arroyo Jiménez, Constitutional Empathy and
Judicial Dialogue in the European Union, 24 EUR. PUB. L. 57 (2018).
98. This approach calls for a reading of the Constitution strongly focused on a
vision of nation-state which, in certain aspects, recalls critical moments of the history of
North American federalism such as that of the constitutional conflict of 1828 with South
Carolina. See The South Carolina Nullification Controversy, US HISTORY.ORG, https://www.
ushistory.org/us/24c.asp [https://perma.cc/R8X3-6WGE].
99. According to the “eternity clause,” no amendments to the Constitution that
affect the division of the State into Länder, nor the fundamental participation of the
Länder to the legislative power or the principles laid down in Articles 1 and 20 of the
Grundgesetz, shall be admissible. See Ondrej Preuss, The Eternity Clause as a Smart
Investment-Lessons from the Czech Case Law, 57 HUNGARIAN J. LEGAL STUD. 289, 291
(2016).
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compliance tools is concerned with the respect of national constitutional
traits, which represents a constraint for the European Union. The second,
ultra vires, is instead used as a criterion to ensure compliance with the
integration program and the principle of conferral, both of which prerequisites
for the law originally authorizing the ratification of the European Treaties
by Germany.100 Should an act of an EU institution be at odds with ultra
vires, it would not bind any public power and would be considered
inapplicable within the German legal system.101
Considering the above background that the CJEU was very aware of,
the decision of the CJEU in Gauweiler proved to be authoritative and
flexible at the same time: while leaving no space for a reductionist view
of the principle of supremacy, it allowed the BVerfG to carve out its own
position which was in line with its own principles.102 Gauweiler thus
became an example of a firm, but evolutionary, dialogue. As it has been
rightly observed, in its decision the CJEU was indeed smart enough to
“accept the challenge but not the provocation” raised by the BVerfG.103 It
did not question the national rules governing the judicial review of the
OMT measures, nor the organization of the domestic judicial proceedings.104
It did not express any views on the BVerfG’s power, merely confining
itself to a simple statement that preliminary rulings are binding on
National Courts.105 It wisely provided its answers without discussing in
detail the BVerfG’s analysis, in opposition to the opinion provided by
Advocate General Crus Villalón who had presented a long examination of

100. See BVerfGE, 2 BvR 2661/06, July 7, 2010, [https://perma.cc/XBM6-AMAK];
Press Release, ESM Members sign revised treaty entrusting the institution with new tasks,
EUROPEAN STABILITY MECHANISM (Jan. 1, 2021), https://www.esm.europa.eu/press-releases/
esm-members-sign-revised-treaty-entrusting-institution-new-tasks [https://perma.cc/8YM3RB7V]; and BVerfGE, 2 BvR 2735/14, Dec. 7, 2015 [https://perma.cc/2FUK-M5WJ]
(the BVerfG denied the execution of a European arrest warrant).
101. Catharina von Berg, ‘Whatever It Takes’ under the Ultra Vires Scrutiny of the
German Constitutional Court, OXFORD BUS. L. BLOG (June 3, 2020), https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/
business-law-blog/blog/2020/06/whatever-it-takes-under-ultra-vires-scrutiny-germanconstitutional [https://perma.cc/M7FB-TA9D].
102. As to the flexibility allowed by the conclusions reached in Gauweiler, see
Matthias Goldmann, Constitutional Pluralism as Mutually Assured Discretion: The CJEU,
the BVerfG, and the ECB, 23 MAASTRICT J. EUR. & COMP. 119 (2016); see also Darius
Adamanski, Economic Constitution of the Euro Area After the Gauweiler Preliminary
Ruling, 52 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1485 (2015).
103. Tridimas & Xanthoulis, supra note 82, at 35.
104. Tridimas & Xanthoulis, supra note 82, at 35.
105. Tridimas & Xanthoulis, supra note 82, at 35.
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the alleged impact of the OMT programme on Germany’s constitutional
principles.106
Gauweiler may be rightly considered an example of a constructive
dialogue between Courts, similar to that tested, albeit more articulately, in
Taricco.107 Despite the first impression of judicial confrontation, in Gauweiler
the Courts operated in a cooperative way, found a way to cut edges, and
paved the way to what some authors have labelled an example of “cooperative
constitutionalism” between the CJEU and the German Constitutional
Court.108
B. Preliminary Reference with a De-Constructive Result: Weiss (2020)
The path of Weiss, culminating in the BVerfG’s judgment in May 2020,
is similar to that of Gauweiler: it began with an appeal filed to the BVerfG
followed by the BVerfG’s suspension of its decision by raising a
preliminary reference to the CJEU and ended with a decision from the
judges of Karlsruhe.109 In Weiss, however, the BVerfG refused to follow
the decision rendered by the CJEU.110 Like Gauweiler, the controversy in
Weiss concerned a non-conventional stimulus measure adopted by the
ECB in 2015: the Public Sector Purchase Program (“PSPP”).111 Despite
the differences between the PSPP and the OMT programme (the most
evident of which is that the PSPP was effectively implemented), issues
106. See Paul Craig & Menelaos Markakis, Gauweiler and the Legality of Outright
Monetary Transactions, 41 EUR. L. REV. 1, 22, 23 (2016); Tridimas & Xanthoulis, supra
note 82, at 17; Hinarejos, supra note 81, at 563; Thierry Bonneau, Programme sur les
opérations monétaires sur titres: la CJUE conforte la BCE, 29 LA SEMAINE JURIDIQUE
1426 (2015).
107. Although the epilogue of the Gauweiler case was in line with the position of
the CJEU (and, therefore, with that of the ECB), the judgment of the BVerfG is not devoid
of complexities. These points of disagreements could already be detected by looking at the
judgement of the CJEU, but they do not change the ultimate assessment of the case: rather,
they confirm the fact that the dialogue can be, at times, problematic, and that it can be
quite interactive. See, Craig & Markakis, supra note 106, at 21 (discussing the ambiguities
of Gauweiler); Federico Fabbrini, After the OMT Case: The Supremacy of EU Law as the
Guarantee of the Equality of the Member States, 16 GER . L.J. 1005 (2015); Carsten
Gerner-Beuerle, Esin Küçük & Edmund-Philipp, Law Meets Economics in the German
Federal Constitutional Court: Outright Monetary Transactions on Trial, 15 GER. L.J. 282
(2014).
108. MARTINICO & POLLICINO, supra note 1, at 17. Other Authors have described this
situation as showing “circumspection” in the attitude of the CJEU and of the BVerfG, see, e.g.,
NEIL M AC CORMICK, QUESTIONING SOVEREIGNTY : LAW, S TATE, AND NATION IN THE
EUROPEAN COMMONWEALTH 119 (1999); see, e.g., Arnull, supra note 7, at 112.
109. See BVerfGE, 2 BvR 2728/13, Jan. 14, 2010 [https://perma.cc/CAN4-W6V3].
110. Case C-493/17, Weiss and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2018:1000, ¶¶ 13–15 (Dec. 11,
2018).
111. See Klaus Tuori, The ECB’s Quantitative Easing Programme as a Constitutional
Game Changer, 23 MAASTRICT J. EUR. & COMP. 94, 101 (2019).
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raised before the BVerfG in Gauweiler and Weiss were similar.112 Once
again, in Weiss the discussion was whether the decisions with which the
PSPP was launched were in conflict: (1) with Article 123 of the TFEU
(ultra vires); (2) with the principle of conferral, enshrined in Article 5,
paragraph 1 of the TEU, to be read in conjunction with Articles 119 and
127 of the TFEU; or (3) with the fundamental principles established by
the German Constitution that were already under review in Gauweiler.113
On all of these topics, the CJEU’s responses in the preliminary ruling were
in clear favor of the ECB: The PSPP was not a manifestly disproportionate
measure to achieve the objective of price stability; the ECB had no other
means available to achieve similar objectives; the measure was not
selective; it was subject to a quantitative limit and to a specific duration;
it provided for an obligation upon national central banks to purchase
eligible securities from issuers in their country; and it laid down criteria
for the distribution of losses compliant with the principles of the Treaty.114
In accordance with Gauweiler, the CJEU pointed out in Weiss that, in
order to determine whether a measure falls within the sphere of monetary
policy, it is necessary to refer mainly to the objectives of this measure and
to the means that such measure puts in place to achieve its objectives.115
112. The programme allows National Central Banks to purchase public debt
securities of the euro area states so to reduce deflation risk and keep the inflation rate close
to the 2% target. See Court of Justice of the European Union Press Release 192/18, The
ECB’s PSPP Programme for the Purchase of Government Bonds on Secondary Markets
does not Infringe EU Law (Dec. 11, 2018). On the Weiss saga, see Volume 21, Issue 5,
GER. L.J. (2020), https://germanlawjournal.com/volume-21-issue-5/ [https://perma.cc/ UDF3QZW3]. See also Fabian Amtenbrink & Renè Repasi, The German Federal Constitutional
Court’s decision in Weiss: a Contextual Analysis, 45 E. L. R EV. 757 (2020); Filippo
Annunziata, et. al., Weiss and EU Union Banking Law. A Test for the Fundamental Principles
of the Treaty, in EUROPEAN BANKING INSTITUTE WORKING PAPER 1 (Ser. No. 67, 2020)
[https://perma.cc/M7VL-4YYX]; Antonia Baraggia & Giuseppe Martinico, Who is the
Master of the Treaties? The Compact Theory in Karlsruhe 28 (2020), http://www.ordines.it/
who-is-the-master-of-the-treaties-the-compact-theory-in-karlsruhe/ [https://perma.cc/JN297NHG].
113. Case C-493/17, Weiss and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2018:1000 (Dec. 11, 2018). To
be precise, the CJEU analyzed the PSPP programme in three main aspects: the duty to
state reasons; the nature of the decision itself (economic policy vs. monetary policy); its
compliance with Article 119, Article 123 paragraph 1, and Article 127, paragraphs 1 and
2 of the TFEU. The Court’s judgment was rendered on December 11, 2018 and upheld the
ECB decision by arguing that the ECB’s decision was sufficiently motivated , and
that the PSPP could not be assimilated to an economic policy measure.
114. Id. at ¶¶ 81–96.
115. Id. at ¶ 53 (citing Case C-62/14, Gauweiler and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2015:400,
¶ 46 (June 16, 2015)).
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The objectives pursued are, therefore, prevalent upon the means employed;
this is a central point of disagreement between the CJEU and the BVerfG
that already emerged in Gauweiler even though ultimately the edges were
cut down there, and that now explodes in Weiss II.116
As one of the core issues in both Gauweiler and Weiss was the kind and
level of judicial review of the decisions of the ECB, the CJEU confirmed
that, in order to “make ‘technical choices and make complex forecasts and
assessments,’” such as those relating to “open market” transactions, the
ECB enjoys “broad discretion;” judicial control is aimed at verifying whether,
with respect to monetary policy objectives, the ECB made a ‘manifest’
error of assessment.117 The Court in Weiss clearly said that it did not intend
to limit itself to verifying the material accuracy, reliability, or consistency
of the evidence adduced, but that it should ascertain whether these elements
constitute the set of relevant data that must be taken into consideration in
assessing a complex situation and whether they are such as to corroborate
the conclusions that have been drawn.118
While Gauweiler provided a happy ending because the BVerfG accepted
the decision of the CJEU, the opposite is true for Weiss. In the following
judgment on May 5, 2020 (hereinafter referred to as Weiss II),119 the BVerfG
harshly disagreed with the conclusions reached by the CJEU. This was
new and quite unexpected. The conclusion of the ruling is also atypical:
the BVerfG, while addressing its command to the German constitutional
bodies, ordered that additional reasons be provided in support of the
legitimacy of the PSPP by the ECB within three months from the decision.120
116. BVerfG, 2 BvR 859/15, May 5, 2020, https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/
SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/EN/2020/05/rs20200505_2bvr085915en.html [https://perma.cc/
52VU-KQ8T].
117. Case C-493/17, Weiss and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2018:1000 (Dec. 11, 2018), at
¶ 24. Article 35.1 of the Statute of the ECB and the ESCB expressly provide that the acts
or omissions of the ECB are subject to examination or interpretation by the Court of Justice
in the cases and conditions established by the Treaty. See Grainger and others v. United
Kingdom, App. No. 34940/10, ¶ 36 (July 10, 2012), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001112312 [https://perma.cc/3MMB-KUMF], see also Mamatas and others v. Greece, App.
No. 63066/14, 64297/14, and 66106/14, ¶¶ 88–89 (July 21, 2016), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
eng?i=001-164969 [https://perma.cc/CEF8-ZSNG] (for discussion of the need to ensure
wide margins of discretion to the authorities in charge of conducting economic and social
policies); see also Matthias Goldmann, Adjudicating Economics? Central Bank Independence
and the Appropriate Standard of Judicial Review, 15 GER. L.J. 265, 271–80 (2014) (providing
a doctrinal point of view).
118. Similar principles have emerged in the field of competition law. See Andriani
Kalintiri, What’s in a Name? The Marginal Standard of Review of ‘Complex Economic
Assessments’ in EU Competition Enforcement, 53 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1283 (2016).
119. BVerfG, 2 BvR 859/15, May 5, 2020, https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/
SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/EN/2020/05/rs20200505_2bvr085915en.html [https://perma.cc/
E9K8-TCQ4].
120. Id. at ¶ 235.
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Otherwise, the German Bundesbank would no longer be allowed to
participate in the ECB’s support programme, despite its being part of the
European System of Central Banks (and the related independence requirement,
under Article 130 of the TFEU).121
Weiss is therefore an astonishing example of dialogue turned to conflict
in the context of EU Banking and Financial legislation. It ended with a
solution that disregards the outcome of the preliminary judgment and also
clearly undermines the principle of supremacy of EU Law.
The ground-breaking decision of the BVerfG in Weiss is articulated
along points of reference similar to the ones developed in Gauweiler: ultra
vires,122 conferral,123 and proportionality. The core of the decision, where
the dialogue between the two Courts turns into dissent, hinges on
proportionality and the duty to state reasons.124 According to the BVerfG,
the ECB did not properly carry out or explain its proportionality assessment,
and, as to the CJEU, the proportionality point was not properly reviewed
by the Court in Luxembourg in its Weiss I judgment.125 Without too many
circumlocutions, and with a shockingly harsh tone, the BVerfG labeled
the judgement of the CJEU as “not comprehensible”126 and devoid of any
effect (neither binding nor persuasive) within the German legal system.
Since the starting point and the basic assumptions in Weiss are not so
different from those in Gauweiler, one may wonder what went wrong, and
how a constructive dialogue could turn into open confrontation.
121. See Dieter Grimm, A long Time Coming, 21 GER. L.J. 944 (2020); see also
Stanislav Biernat, How Far Is It from Warsaw to Luxembourg and Karlsruhe: The Impact of
the PSPP Judgment on Poland, 21 GER. L.J. 1104 (2020) (discussing how the decision has
been hauled in some EU countries, including Poland, where it sparked some Nationalist
reactions).
122. See Karsten Schneider, Gauging “Ultra-Vires”: The Good Parts, 21 GER. L.J.
968 (2020) (discussing ultra vires in Weiss II).
123. Conferral and the ultra vires doctrine are linked: an act that exceeds the
competences that member states have consciously intended to transfer to the Union is ultra
vires. The (poisonous) shade of the BVerfG’s judgment concerns the fact that the principle
of conferral could be violated due to the effects produced by two elements: the wide
discretion that the Treaty recognizes to the ECB, and the “limited standard of review” that the
CJEU carries out with regard to its decisions, especially those relating to monetary policy
functions. See BVerfG, 2 BvR 859/15, May 5, 2020, ¶ 156, https://www.bundes verfassungs
gericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/EN/2020/05/rs20200505_2bvr085915en.html
[https://perma.cc/E9K8-TCQ4].
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Simon Sven & Hannes Rathke, “Simply not comprehensible.” Why?, 21 GER.
L.J. 950, 954 (2020).
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The answer lies in the fact that, in Weiss II, the BVerfG believed that
insufficient elements were provided to assess compliance with those same
principles asserted in Gauweiler.127 In short, one is not faced with a
revision of the principles previously applied by the BVerfG, nor with a refoundation of the theories on the counter-limits of the Grundgesetz.128 The
issue in Weiss II instead revolved around motivation, clarity, and statements
of reason.129 According to the BVerfG, insufficient justification and
statement of reasons were provided to support that the PSPP was limited
to the scope of pursuing mere monetary policy objectives, and did not,
instead, turn into a measure compromising the exclusive reserve upon the
Member States in terms of economic policy. Unlike Gauweiler, in Weiss,
the reaction of the BverfG to this alleged default of the ECB’s decision
(and of the judgment rendered by the CJEU) turned out to be excessive,
and actually became an improper invocation of the principles of ultra
vires, conferral, and ultimately infringement of German constitutional
counter-limits.130 The dialogue became in some way hysterical and whimsical;
accordingly, the outcome in Weiss II was also the consequence of the
ambiguities of the architecture of the Treaties concerning the ECB’s
power and role that ultimately came into light.131
The possible future consequences of the Weiss II judgement are unclear.
On the one hand, the CJEU hastily issued an (unprecedented) press release
in which it stressed that the ECB is subject to the exclusive judicial review
of the Court in Luxembourg and that National Courts must give full effect
to EU Law.132 On the other hand, the ECB made available additional
documentation supporting its decision, but this apparently was not
127. According to Phedon Nicolaides, in Weiss II, instead, the BverfG invented a
new concept of proportionality as it argued that the proportionality test requires balancing
between “conflicting” policy objectives, whereas no such balancing obligation is imposed
on the ECB by the Article 127 of the TFEU. See Phedon Nicolaides, The Judgment of
the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany on the Public Sector Asset Purchase Programme
of the European Central Bank: Setting an Impossible and Contradictory Test of
Proportionality, EU L. L IVE (May 15, 2020), https://eulawlive.com/op-ed-thejudgment-of-the-federal-constitutional-court-of-germany-on-the-public-sector-assetpurchase-programme-of-the-european-central-bank-setting-an-impossible-and-contradictorytest-of/ [https://perma.cc/8X7D-ZT3M].
128. BVerfG, 2 BvR 859/15, May 5, 2020, ¶¶ 1, 143, https://www.bundesver
fassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/EN/2020/05/rs20200505_2bvr085915en
.html [https://perma.cc/E9K8-TCQ4].
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. This point is set out by Amtenbrink & Repasi, supra note 112, at 757–78.
132. For a comprehensive analysis of the press release where the Court raised the
issue of equality among Member States as one of the foundational reasons for the need to
ensure full effect, see Justine Lindeboom, Is the Primacy of EU Law Based on the Equality of
the Member States?, 21 GER. L.J. 1032 (2020).
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sufficient, as the media has reported that a new claim has been filed to the
BVerfG by the promoters of the case in Germany asking for the judgment
to be enforced.133
Recent news indicates that the EU Commission opened an infringement
procedure against Germany, but it is doubtful whether this would be feasible
or even useful at all.134 In the meantime, the judgement almost immediately
triggered a hot debate as to the institutional structure of the EU insofar as
monetary and economic policy are concerned.135 It also sparked discussions
regarding the structure of the Court of Justice, so as to allow it to better
handle this kind of discourse (or confrontation). Some commentators
believe that new formal venues of dialogue among EU Courts should
be implemented, including the setting up of special chambers where NCCs
and the CJEU might convene when high-level issues are discussed, including
Constitutional law and fundamental rights. 136 If this idea was indeed
implemented, there would be an official arena for judicial dialogue between
Courts of the highest order in the EU, which would provide a solution to
at least some of the problems that are inevitably linked to the structure of
the preliminary reference procedure.
The decision of the BVerfG in Weiss has been severely criticized on a
number of grounds, as it clearly goes against the principle of supremacy

133. The news of the new claim aired on August 5, 2020. See, Holger Beckmann,
Ultimatum abgelaufen - drei Monate nach dem Karlsruher EZB-Urteil [Ultimatum expired –
three months after the Karlsruhe ECB judgment], TAGESSCHAU (Aug. 5, 2020), https://
www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/audio/audio-94121.html [https://perma.cc/E2LT-HSV9];
see also Klaus Hempel, Anleihekäufe erneut Thema in Karlsruhe [Bond purchases again
a topic in Karlsruhe], T AGESSCHAU (Aug. 5, 2020), https://www.tagesschau.de/
wirtschaft/faq-ezb-anleihenkaeufe-bverfg-101.html [https://perma.cc/S46P-J5QX].
134. Marco Dani & Joana Mendes, The Infringement Procedure over Weiss: A
Sceptical Appraisal, EU BLOG (June 23, 2021), https://www.eublog.eu/articolo/34784/
The-Infringement-Procedure-over-Weiss:-a-Sceptical-Appraisal-/Marco-Dani-e-JoanaMendes- [https://perma.cc/3XA6-4HPL]; see Sara Poli & Roberto Cisotta, The German
Federal Constitutional Court’s Exercise of Ultra Vires Review and the Possibility to Open
an Infringement Action for the Commission, 21 GER. L.J. 1078 (2020).
135. See Matthias Goldmann, The European Economic Constitution after the PSPP
Judgment: Towards Integrative Liberalism?, 21 GER. L.J. 1058 (2020) (providing an example
of how far imagination can go).
136. Daniel Sarmiento & Joseph H. H. Weiler, The EU Judiciary After Weiss: Proposing
A New Mixed Chamber of the Court of Justice, VERFASSUNGSBLOG (June 2, 2020),
https://verfassungsblog.de/the-eu-judiciary-after-weiss/ [https://perma.cc/GY7Z-2FEM];
Id.; Europe and its Multiple Constitutions, EU L AW LIVE, July 15, 2020, Editorial
Comment No. 3, at 15, https://eulawlive.com/editorial-comment-europe-and-its-multipleconstitutions/.
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of EU Law and that of the binding force of CJEU decisions.137 Like all
bad experiences, the BVerfG’s decision can teach a lesson.138 First, it
shows that dialogue can also turn into open confrontation and dissent, and
that preliminary reference is not to be handled lightly,139 as it is not a cure
for all diseases.140 Second, it shows that a careful exercise of evaluating
costs and benefits of a procedure should always be carried out by a Court
that considers resorting to preliminary reference.141 These lessons appear
especially important in the current context where most of the groundbreaking and extraordinary measures adopted by the ECB as a necessary
and firm response to the global pandemic crisis are likely to be criticized
on grounds not so different from the ones raised in Gauweiler and Weiss
as explained below.142
C. Parallel Discourses and Cross References: Landeskreditbank
and the Banking Union Judgments
The path of what, for simplicity, will be referred to as the LandeskreditbankBanking Union cases, proved to be different from that of Gauweiler and
the more recent Weiss. The cases show that, particularly in the context of
EU Banking Legislation, new patterns for the dialogue between EU
Courts are quickly developing based on mutual consideration and crossreferences rather than on more formal, institutional channels such as the
ones provided for by preliminary reference to the CJEU.
137. In absolute terms, this was not the very first time that a NCC challenged the
decisions of the CJEU. Two other precedents may be recalled: the Polish case Ústavní
soud České republiky nalez ze dne 31.1.2012 (ÚSn) [Judgment of the Constitutional Court
of January 31, 2012], sp.zn Pl. ÚS 5/12 (Czech) and the Danish case Højesteret, 1.
Afdeling [1st Chamber of the Supreme Court], arrêt 06/12/2016 [judgment of June 12,
2016] (Sag 15/2014) (Den.). These were, however, cases that looked like the result of a
politically biased approach. More importantly, they were different from Weiss in terms of
the influential role played by the relevant CC and also by the State involved which, in
Weiss, is the most powerful and influential State among Member States.
138. See generally Niels Petersen, Karlsruhe’s Lochner Moment? A Rational Choice
Perspective on the German Federal Constitutional Court’s Relationship to the CJEU After the
PSPP Decision, 21 GER. L.J. 995 (2020) (stressing that, probably not by chance, shortly after
the decision, Germany and France rapidly found their agreement on the EU Recovery
Plan).
139. Cf. Schneider, supra note 122, at 968–78.
140. See Giuseppe Martinico, Preliminary Reference and Constitutional Courts: Are
you in the Mood for Dialogue? (Tilburg Inst. of Compar. Transnat’l L. Working Paper No.
2009/10, 2009).
141.
Raising the point most effectively is Tridimas & Xanthoulis, supra note 82, at
17.
142. René Smits, The European Central Bank’s Pandemic Bazooka: Mandate Fulfillment
in Extraordinary Times, in EU LAW IN TIMES OF PANDEMIC: THE EU’S LEGAL RESPONSE
TO THE COVID-19 CRISIS 241 (Delores Utrilla, Anjum Shabbir eds., EuLawLive Press 2021).

46

ANNUNZIATA.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

[VOL. 23: 21, 2021]

1/24/2022 11:48 AM

The Role of EU Banking Legislation
SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J.

A few remarks on the substance and history of the cases are necessary,
albeit by truly simplifying the many technical and complex issues of these
cases. Topics discussed in these cases concern, among others, the exercise
of the supervisory functions attributed to the ECB by the SSMR.143 The
cases developed in parallel in front of the BVerfG (Banking Union) and
of the CJEU (Landeskreditbank).144 For the BVerfG, similar to Gauweiler
and Weiss, the controversy was initiated by a group of German citizens
that challenged certain provisions of EU Banking Law (this time, secondary
EU Legislation) in the context of German Constitutional principles.145 As
to the CJEU, the case started from an appeal lodged to the Court by a
German bank, the Landeskreditbank Baden-Württemberg – Förderbank,
against a decision made by the ECB in its supervisory functions. The
contested decision concerned the request of Landeskreditbank to be
considered, by way of derogation, as a less significant credit institution,
and therefore supervised by National Competent Authorities (“NCAs”),
instead of the ECB, based on the provisions of Article 70(4) of Regulation
468/2014 (the so-called “Framework Regulation”).146 Since the ECB did
not accept the bank’s request, the Landeskreditbank addressed the Court
to challenge the ECB’s decision (after, however, having submitted the
issue to the internal ECB’s Administrative Board of Review). The dispute
with the ECB ended with a ruling of the CJEU.147 The most significant
finding of the Court’s judgment resulted in the statement (which technically
is a mere “obiter dictum”) that, in the SSM founding regulation, the ECB
is conferred exclusive power to exercise prudential supervision over all
the banks included in the related area of operations (regardless of their
relevance or size), whereas NCAs fulfil their functions on a decentralized
basis with respect to the ECB.148
143. See Filippo Annunziata, European Banking Supervision in the Age of the ECB:
Landeskreditbank Baden-Württemberg—Förderbank v. ECB, 21 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV.
545 (2020).
144. Filippo Annunziata, Marco Lamandini & David Ramos Munoz, Weiss and EU
Union Banking Law. A Test for the Fundamental Principles of the Treaty, 67 (European
Banking Institute Working Paper Series 2020, Paper No. 61, 2020), at 13.
145. The chronology of the two events is as follows: Landeskreditbank’s appeal
before the CJEU was introduced on March 12, 2015; the appeal of the members of Europolis
to the BVerfG was presented in 2014. See id. at 15, note 17.
146. Id. at 13.
147. Case C-450/17, Landeskreditbank Baden-Württemberg v. ECB, ECLI:EU:C:
2019:372 (May 8, 2019).
148. Cf. Stefano Montemaggi, Case-study: Judgments of the General Court and of
the CJEU on the Landeskreditbank, in LAW AND P RACTICE OF THE BANKING UNION AND
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In Landeskreditbank, the CJEU did not directly address the compatibility
of the SSM founding Regulation with the principles of subsidiarity and
proportionality of the Treaty, as these issues were not pleaded in the
appeal presented by the Bank. 149 Instead, those were the main themes
developed in the appeal presented to the BVerfG regarding the compatibility
of the SSMR with the Treaties and with the constitutional counter-limits
posed by the German Grundgesetz. Ultimately, the BVerfG declared
inadmissible, and/or rejected all claims.150 However, this happy ending
came at a price: that of reinterpreting the “parallels” of the CJEU’s
decision in regard to the allocation of competences between the ECB and
NCAs to the point of a clear-cut reversal of the findings of the CJEU in
Landeskreditbank.151 Indeed, among the various issues addressed in the
BVerfG ruling in the Banking Union case, the most important is the
division of competences recognized by the SSM Regulation, as treated by
the CJEU in Landreskreditbank.152 The BVerfG concluded that the
adoption of the SSM Regulation does not significantly and manifestly
OF ITS GOVERNING INSTITUTIONS (CASES AND MATERIALS) 217 (Raffaele

D’Ambrosio ed.,
2020); Filippo Annunziata, European Banking Supervision in the Age of the ECB:
Landeskreditbank Baden-Württemberg—Förderbank v. ECB, EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 545
(2020), https://doi.org/10.1007/s40804-019-00170-y [https://perma.cc/NM5T-8GLH]. See
also Sèbastien Adalid, Le MSU, nouveau sous-système de droit de l’Union européenne, 2
R ÉVUE DES AFFAIRES EUROPÉENNES 363 (2017); Raffaele d’Ambrosio & Marco
Lamandini, La “prima volta” del Tribunale dell’Unione europea in materia di Meccanismo di
Vigilanza Unico, 44 GIUR. COMM. II (2017); Tobias H. Tröger, How Not to Do Banking Law in
the 21st Century: The Judgement of the European General Court (EGC) in the Case T122/15 – Landeskreditbank Baden-Württemberg – Förderbank v. European Central Bank
(ECB), OXFORD BUS. L. BLOG (June 16, 2016), https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/ business-lawblog/blog/2017/06/how-not-do-banking-law-21st-century-judgement-european-general-court
[https://perma.cc/2T9R-KR2R].
149. Annunziata, Lamandini & Munoz, supra note 144, at 15.
150. As for the SRM, the BVerfG notes that the tasks assigned to the SRB comply
with the standards established by the CJEU on the application of Article 114 of the
TFEU. Furthermore, the competences of the SRB are well defined (paragraphs 255-258 of
the judgement) do not concern fundamental issues regulated by the SRMR itself (paragraph 260
of the judgement) and are limited to what is necessary from the point of view of the Union
legislator (paragraph 261 of the judgment). Id. at 16.
151. In the case of the BVERFG’s judgment on the Banking Union, the German
Court did not deem it necessary to make a preliminary reference to the ECJ. The interpretation
of TFEU Article 127(6) in relation to the SSMR would be easy, as the SMM does not
constitute a sufficiently significant violation of the Union’s membership programme.
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVERFG] [Federal Constitutional Court] May 16, 2017,
Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts 1, 8 (Ger.).
152. In the case of the BVERFG’s judgment on the Banking Union, the German
Court did not deem it necessary to make a preliminary reference to the ECJ. The
interpretation of TFEU Article 127(6) in relation to the SSMR would be easy, as the
SMM does not constitute a sufficiently significant violation of the Union’s membership
programme. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVERFG] [Federal Constitutional Court] May
16, 2017, Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts 1, 8 (Ger.).
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exceed the powers conferred on the European Union by the Treaties.153
Therefore, it does not constitute an ultra vires act according to the
constitutionality control criteria established by the BVerfG, as long as the
provisions of the SSM Regulation are interpreted restrictively.154
How does the BVerfG’s decision in the Banking Union case compare
with the CJEU’s decision in Landeskreditbank? The BVerfG believes the
Luxembourg court’s statements regarding the role of the ECB in terms of
division of competences between the ECB and NCAs is little more than
an obiter dictum given that the dispute decided by the CJEU only concerned
the interpretation of Article 6, paragraph 4, subsection 2 of the SSMR and
Article 70(4) of the Framework Regulation.155 According to its own
corrective reading, the BVerfG points out that in Landeskreditbank the
CJEU had, with binding effect, only ascertained that the exclusive competence
of the ECB is limited to determining the definition of “special
circumstances.”156
According to the BVerfG, the CJEU did not actually rule on the
compatibility of the SSMR with the fundamental principles of the Treaty,
including proportionality and subsidiarity.157 Thus, the CJEU left to the
BVerfG full capacity of checking that the Regulation (and other related
provisions of EU Banking Law) does not violate fundamental principles
of the German Constitution.158 On this point, which stands at the core of
the controversy raised in front of the BVerfG, the Court can therefore
provide its own interpretation by stating that the SSM Regulation is in line
with those principles, as long as it is interpreted on a restrictive basis.159
In doing so, the BVerfG manages to bypass the obstacle of one of the most
relevant parts of the CJEU judgment: the part where, albeit in a form
which is effectively that of obiter dictum, the Court argues that the ECB
is entrusted with the task of carrying out prudential supervision on all
credit institutions falling within the scope of the SSM Regulation, regardless
of their dimensions and/or relevance, whereas NCAs perform those same
tasks on a decentralized basis.160

153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id. at 3.
Id.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 7.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 12–13.
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In this form of dialogue, where Courts proceed on parallel grounds,
omissions and silences may be more important than open discourse or
confrontation. Apart from its technicalities, the Landeskreditbank/Banking
Union decisions offer an example of an innovative path of discourse
among Courts that is likely to develop in the future, especially in the
context of the novelties and complexities of the new EU banking and
financial legislation. It is a path that, while not being formal (such as in
the context of a preliminary reference), is more overt than what can be
found in other “informal” discourses as it explicitly and openly conducts
a discourse with the other Court’s position, focused on the re-reading and
re-elaborating of the latter’s judgement in a connected or related case. It
is not, therefore, a silent form of dialogue; it is an open discourse, but one
that follows mostly unprecedented paths, rendered possible by the
peculiarities of EU Banking Legislation.
D. The Innovative Provision of Article 4(3) of the SSM Regulation:
New Kinds of Dialogues and New Issues
According to Article 4(3) of the SSMR: “For the purpose of carrying
out the tasks conferred on it by this Regulation, and with the objective of
ensuring high standards of supervision, the ECB shall apply all relevant
Union law, and where this Union law is composed of Directives, the
national legislation transposing those Directives.”161 Article 4(3) clarifies
that, where relevant European Union law consists of Regulations, and these
Regulations explicitly grant options to Member States, the ECB shall also
apply National Law that exercises such options.162 It follows that the
ECB’s scope of action is not limited to EU Law, but also includes National
Law, to the extent that the National Law is the outcome of the transposition
of Directives, or results from the options and discretions left to Member
States by EU Regulations.163
Article 4(3) has rightly been indicated as one of the most innovative
rules of the entire system introduced by the Banking Union.164 In fact, it
has no equivalent in any other area of EU Law. The novelty of the provision
appears in all its clarity and problematic nature if one considers that, in

161. 2013 O.J. (L 287) 74.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. See Amtenbrink & Repasi, supra note 112, at 170; Fabio Giglioni, The European
Banking Union as a New Model of Administrative Integration?, THE ADMIN. ARCHITECTURE
OF FIN. INTEGRATION. INST. DESIGN, LEGAL ISSUES, PERSP. 123 (Edoardo Chiti & Giulio
Vesperini eds., 2015); Andreas Witte, The Application of National Banking Supervision
Law by the ECB: Three Parallel Modes of Executing EU Law?, 21 MAASTRICHT J.
EUROPEA COMPAR. L. 89 (2014).
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the event of judicial review, the CJEU must deal with Article 4(3) and,
thereby, apply National legislation. This happens when a decision from
the ECB based on that provision is challenged in front of the Court. The
application of the principle iura novit curia, with regards to (at least)
nineteen different legislations (these being those that, at present, fall within
the scope of the SSM Regulation) is a daunting challenge for the otherwise,
well-equipped judges in Luxembourg.165
It must be said that, apart from Article 4(3) of the SSMR, the CJEU
frequently investigates National Law, such as in the context of preliminary
references.166 Moreover, it is from the legal traditions of the Member
States that the CJEU has drawn some of the most important general
principles of EU Law; the comparative method (that clearly implies
continuous references to EU Law and that of the Member States) has been
rightly singled out as one of the most important principles used by the
CJEU.167 However, in all of these circumstances, the Court’s approach to
National Law is not aimed at applying National Law in itself, but at
applying EU Law. This is precisely where the novelty and potentially
subversive nature of Article 4(3) of the SSMR becomes evident. Resorting
to Article 4(3) results in a true reversal of perspective, producing a similar
effect to turning the vision of a telescope upside down. Because the ECB
(and the CJEU, in the event of a dispute) must apply domestic law resulting
from the transposition of EU Law, a double reversal occurs. In the (broadly
speaking) “legislative” phase, supranational law (EU Law) is implemented
and transposed at the internal level and, therefore, “drops” down from top
to bottom. In the subsequent phase, where Article 4(3) comes into play,
domestic law is applied at the supranational level and, therefore, “rises”
from the bottom to the top.168
The application of Article 4(3) and of judicial review thereunder, invites
the development of new strands of dialogue between EU Courts, including
that between Constitutional Courts and the CJEU. The situation is unique:
the CJEU, in its review of an ECB’s decision taken pursuant to Article
4(3) of the SSMR, must apply EU Law as well as National Law (which at

165. 2013 O.J. (L 287) 74.
166. Id.
167. MARTINICO & POLLICINO, supra note 1, at 9; No 0 1/05, Judgment, ¶ 2 (Trybunal
konstytucyjny Apr. 27, 2005).
168. See Andrea Magliari, Vigilanza Bancaria e Integrazione Europea. Profili di Diritto
Amministrativo, 216 UNIVERSITA DITRENTO (Nov. 13, 2020).
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least formally, is “foreign” for the CJEU).169 However, the National law
in question results from the implementation of EU Law, and is conditioned
by EU Law and its (binding) interpretation by the CJEU. All of this gives
rise to a unique kind of interaction between courts placed in different legal
systems.170
Another peculiar aspect stemming from Article 4(3) is that the decision
made by the CJEU will inevitably influence the future interpretation of
National Law by National Courts, not only as a consequence of the principles
of supremacy and effective cooperation, but also as a persuasive precedent.
In particular, the persuasive force of the interpretation provided by the
CJEU might become relevant in relation to elements of National Law that
the CJEU must apply, but that do not depend upon the interpretation of
EU Law, such as, for instance, matters that the Directive clearly leaves in
the hands of Member States. Singling out certain scenarios exemplifies
some of these issues.
The first of these scenarios is if the ECB must apply (and the CJEU
must review) National Law transposing a Directive, when the two perfectly
align. In this situation, the application of either National or European law
produces the same result, and therefore the ECB, in applying National
Law, ensures the application, and respect, of EU Law. If there was space
developed to challenge the ECB’s interpretation and/or application of
domestic law, the CJEU would resolve these questions in accordance with
European law. Because, according to the principle of consistent interpretation,
National and European law would not conflict, there would be no room
for further discussion.
However, there might be potential flaws. Even when National and EU
Law are aligned the ECB may nonetheless misapply National Law. The
defect would not lie in National Law, but in ECB’s application of it. In
this event, the ECB’s measure should be regarded as vitiated: the affected
persons should be positioned to request to the CJEU the annulment of the
decision of the ECB, as being contrary (inter alia) to Article 4(3) of the

169. The point may be controversial as it might be questioned whether, under Article 4(3)
of the ECB, and the CJEU in case of judicial review, are effectively applying National law, or
EU Law, or treating National law simply as an element of fact, or whether a combination
of the above is actually taking place.
170. See Antonios Tzanakopoulos, Judicial Dialogue as a Means of Interpretation,
in THE INTERPRETATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY DOMESTIC COURTS: UNIFORMITY,
DIVERSITY, CONVERGENCE 72–95 (Helmut Philip Aust & Georg Nolte eds., 2016), for a
summary of a process in which a similar, but not identical phenomena of contamination
between different layers happen in international law. However, in the context of Article
4(3) of the SSMR, the peculiarity of the EU legal system together with the principle of
supremacy of EU Law produces a unique blend of issues.
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SSMR.171 In its attempt to understand how National Law should effectively
be applied and interpreted, the CJEU might activate different levels of
dialogue with National Courts. For example, the Court might look for and
consider precedents in similar cases decided by National Courts and cite
them explicitly or implicitly or develop other more informal dialogues.172
A second scenario might occur if the ECB is confronted with the
application of a rule of domestic law that conflicts with EU Law; for example,
a provision of National Law resulting from the incorrect transposition of
a Directive. The peculiar structure of Article 4(3) of the SSMR raises
complex issues. There is uncertainty regarding which criteria the ECB
should follow, as well as the position of the CJEU in the event of judicial
review of the decision adopted by the ECB. One might think the ECB has
limited mobility as Article 4(3) SSMR seems to dictate that the ECB
applies National Law anyway, even if it is in contrast with EU Law.173
However, this conclusion is unsatisfactory. The ECB, as an EU institution,
has the duty to apply and comply with EU Law; while the suggested
solution appears to be formally in line with the provision of Article 4(3)
of the SSMR, it is incompatible with the general principles of EU Law.174
It cannot be denied that the ECB itself is subject to the principle of supremacy
of European law, as clearly specified by Recital 34 of the SSMR which
should be taken into account and states:
For the carrying out of its tasks and the exercise of its supervisory powers, the
ECB should apply the material rules relating to the prudential supervision of credit
institutions. Those rules are composed of the relevant Union law, in particular directly
applicable Regulations or Directives, such as those on capital requirements for
credit institutions and on financial conglomerates. Where the material rules relating to
the prudential supervision of credit institutions are laid down in Directives, the
ECB should apply the national legislation transposing those Directives. Where
the relevant Union law is composed of Regulations and in areas where, on the
date of entry into force of these Regulations, those Regulations explicitly grant
options for Member States, the ECB should also apply the national legislation
exercising such options. Such options should be construed as excluding options
available only to competent or designated authorities. This is without prejudice
to the principle of the primacy of Union law. It follows that the ECB should, when

171. See 2012 O.J. (C 326) 162.
172. MARTINICO & POLLICINO, supra note 1 at 9; No 0 1/05, Judgment, ¶ 2 (Trybunal
konstytucyjny Apr. 27, 2005).
173. See 2013 O.J. (L 287) 74.
174. See id.
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adopting guidelines or recommendations or when taking decisions, base itself on,
and act in accordance with, the relevant binding Union law. 175

To solve this puzzle, different options should be considered. A first
route could be the one that leads the ECB not to apply anything, to suspend
its decision, and eventually take action at an institutional and political level,
including trying to trigger an infringement procedure against the Member
State.176 Provided that this solution can be accepted, its complexity would
inevitably risk compromising the effectiveness and timeliness of the ECB’s
intervention and the efficiency of the SSM’s overall system. Supervisory
measures, in most cases are time sensitive; the protection of the stability
of the system must be assured in a timely and effective manner.
A second option might be to provide the ECB with the power to disapply
domestic law to ensure compliance with the principle of primacy of Union
law. Essentially, in doing so, the ECB would not apply Article 4(3) or,
better yet, it would apply it in a context where primacy of European law
is ensured. This second alternative would, according to most scholars,
clash with the literal formulation of Article 4(3) and presents the issue of
its compatibility with the well-known principles concerning the relationship
between domestic law and Union law: a relationship that, insofar, should
exclude any direct vertical effects to EU Directives.177
Notwithstanding the above, it is even unclear how, and to what extent,
the CJEU can effectively carry out a full, comprehensive review of
National Law in the context of Article 4(3) of the SSMR. This is because
Article 4(3) has not been properly coordinated with the procedural rules
governing the CJEU.178 In fact, on the basis of the current provisions, the
CJEU can rule on the interpretation of EU Law in the context of a dispute
that touches upon National legislation only in the course of a preliminary
ruling under Article 267 of the TFEU.179 Preliminary ruling is limited to
cases of disputes before a National Court; in the context of the SSM, this
would typically be a dispute over a decision taken by a NCA against a

175. Id. at 66.
176. See Amtenbrink & Repasi, supra note 112, at 158.
177. At the current state, there are doubts as to the extension of the review that the
CJEU might carry out when considering the application of national law by the ECB.
Amtenbrink & Repasi, supra note 112, at 162. Another situation involves the contestation of
ECB’s decisions that entail the application of national legislation transposing directives or
exercising member states’ options allegedly in breach of relevant EU Law. A decision of
such a type may be considered a breach of the ECB’s duty under Article 4(3) of the SSM
Regulation to act in compliance with relevant EU Law, and thus can be challenged before
the General Court. In practice, this would involve the review of the compliance of national
legislation with EU Law in the context of a direct action before the General Court.
178. See 2012 O.J. (L 265) 24.
179. 2016 O.J. (202) 164.
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credit institution. Similarly, the plea of illegality under Article 277 of the
TFEU, which allows incidental review of acts of general application
adopted by EU institutions, bodies, offices, or agencies, does not apply to
the review of acts of general application adopted by Member States.180
Considering the above, some have questioned whether the CJEU can
effectively carry out a full legal review of the ECB’s decision taken in
application of National Law.181 The conclusion that it can, however, produces
unsatisfactory and discriminatory results. In fact, a less significant institution,
supervised by NCAs, can instead challenge an act of the competent authority
before a competent national Court and avail itself of the preliminary ruling
procedure.182 There are therefore clear and serious issues of compliance
with the overriding principles of effective judicial review, as stated by the
CJEU and recognized by Article 47 of the CFR. Therefore, solely for the
purpose of judicial review, relevant national legislation applied by a
contested ECB decision should indeed be considered an integral part of
the legal framework that must be considered to assess the legality of the
national legislation; some ground for this interpretation might be found in
a combined reading of Articles 263 and 277 of the TFEU.183
In opposition to this solution, some have argued that a clear division of
tasks between EU and National Courts should be maintained and that the
CJEU should refrain from authoritatively interpreting National Law.184
They argue the CJEU should instead, “liaise closely with the National
Courts with a view to establishing the correct meaning of the national
rules relevant for assessing the legality of the ECB’s decision.”185 Only
future case law might provide further clarification on this crucial point.
However, it is evident that, in either case, dialogue with National Courts
would be essential and of paramount importance to the CJEU.
A third and more radical scenario in which a Member State has not
transposed a Directive within the prescribed deadlines might also be
envisaged. This situation is far from being merely theoretical. For example,
this is precisely what concerned, at least until December 2020, the Italian

180. Id. at 149.
181. See id. at 167.
182. Dominique Ritleng, The ECB’s Power Over Non-Euro Countries in the Banking
Union, SWED. INST. FOR EUR. POL’Y STUD. 12 (Feb. 2020).
183. See 2016 O.J. (202) 149, 157.
184. Bundesverfassungsgericht, [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court], Sept. 12,
2012, 2 BvR 1390/12 [BvR] (Ger.).
185. Id.
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legal system as to the provisions laid down by CRD IV regarding the “fit
and proper test” of the management body and of qualifying shareholders
of credit institutions.186 Similar situations have occurred and might occur
again in the future again in Italy or in another Member State . In this
situation, which is characterized by the absence of domestic law that
implements the provisions of a certain Directive, there might be preexisting national rules relating to the same subject; if this is the case, it
might therefore be acceptable for the ECB to apply whatever National
Law it finds on the basis of prevailing Union Law (i.e., by interpreting it
in context of EU Law).187 However, in an even more extreme case,
National Law on a certain topic covered by a Directive might not even
exist and therefore Article 4(3) of the SSMR would not be applicable.188
Because domestic law on a given matter would simply not be there, the
ECB would have nothing to apply considering National legislation.
Notwithstanding the fact that the ECB may use its powers of persuasion
and/or that of stimulating the intervention of the Commission against the
alleged default of the Member State, the question remains whether, absent
National Legislation, the ECB may adopt a decision simply based on a
provision of a non-transposed Directive according to the interpretation
that it would itself give. This is also taking into account positions expressed
by other authorities, specifically the EBA which may provide a particularly
authoritative interpretation, but in any event, is still a “mere” interpretation.
The current prevailing opinion is that this course of action would not be
permissible, as it would be contrary to the jurisprudence of the CJEU by
admitting the direct application of a Directive which has not been transposed,
though sufficiently detailed, only to entrench rights to be invoked by
individuals and not to be exercised by a public authority.189 The decision
made by the ECB would therefore be illegal; it would have no legal basis
according to EU Law and it would stand in contrast with the limitations
as to the possible vertical effects of EU Directives.190 It would also be in
contrast with National Legislation, and with Article 4(3) of the SSMR.191
No dialogue between Courts could solve the issue.

186. Is the Current “Fit and Proper” Regime Appropriate for the Banking Union?,
EUR. P ARL. DOC. PE 624.442 1, 20 (2020), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/
etudes/IDAN/2020/624442/IPOL_IDA(2020)624442_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/E5EP-55DT].
187. Id. at 18.
188. Id. at 19–20.
189. Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 Conferring Specific
Tasks on the European Central Bank Concerning Policies Relating to the Prudential
Supervision of Credit Institutions, ch. 1, art. 4, ¶ 3, Oct. 15, 2013, 2016 O.J. (L 287/63),
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2013/1024/oj#d1e939-63-1.
190. Id.
191. Id.
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If the above situations clearly show how problematic Article 4(3)
SSMR may be, the apex of the problems is reached when the relevant
National Law that the ECB applied in its decision is challenged as being
unconstitutional. Because this issue would be raised in the context of the
judicial review of the ECB’s decision in front of the CJEU, there seems
to be no way out of the maze. On one hand, the CJEU is not competent to
review the constitutionality of National Law; on the other hand, at least at
the current stage of the debate, no provision allows the CJEU to raise
a question of unconstitutionality in front of the National competent bodies.192
The puzzle cannot be solved by shifting the question at the National level
for the simple reason that the forum for discussion is the CJEU, not a
National Court or body. The CJEU might even consider itself incompetent
and decide not to take up the case at all. The complexities of the situation
would indeed suggest opening informal channels of dialogue with NCCs:
this might help the CJEU to understand whether the issue of unconstitutionality
is well-founded or not, and eventually how it might be solved. However,
the procedural issues in this situation seem to be overwhelming; the
question is not about interpreting or applying National Law, but rather
about deciding whether the CJEU is competent to resolve issues of National
Law or not.
This brief excursus on some of the most important issues raised by
Article 4(3) of the SSMR might provide useful hints that show how varied
and complex judicial dialogue may develop in the area of EU Banking
legislation. The first precedents indeed show how innovative and interesting
this judicial dialogue might be. In Crédit Agricole,193 a first case where
the General Court was confronted with Article 4(3) of the SSMR, the
Court was in some way lucky as the case had already been decided upon
at National level, ending with a decision by the French Conseil d’Etat.194
The General Court based its conclusion on the precedent of the National
Court, however, this was done not by way of a particular interpretation of
French law or the Conseil d’Etat’s decision, but by directly citing and
incorporating the latter into its own decision; a true “cut-and-paste”195
192. See id. at ch. 3, § 1, art. 13, ¶ 2.
193. Caisse régionale de crédit agricole mutuel Alpes Provence and Others v. ECB,
(2018) O.J. (C 200) 30, 30–31.
194. Judgment of the General Court, ¶ 92, Apr. 24, 2018, 2018 O.J. (T 133-36/16),
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:62016TJ0133.
195. What can be gathered from Crédit Agricole reinforces the doubts as to whether
National Law, in the context of the review by the CJEU of a decision by the ECB pursuant
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exercise, that goes well beyond traditional forms of judicial borrowing,
and even of a mere “deferential” approach towards national law. In Crédit
Agricole, the scrutiny of the CJEU also resulted de facto in an indirect,
but formal confirmation of the decision of the Conseil d’Etat by the
General Court, although in a context that had nothing to do with a proper
appeal decision or preliminary reference judgement.196
Crédit Agricole is quite unique because the case had previously been
deferred to National Courts. When the CJEU does not find a precedent on
the same case already decided by a National Court, it would be in a
position to consider similar cases decided by other Courts, and, as it
enjoys full jurisdiction, might use those cases as precedents for the correct
interpretation and application of National Law. The dialogue between the
CJEU and National Courts would then become more dynamic and be part
of the interpretive exercise that judges typically are required to carry out
such as silent dialogue or judicial borrowing. This would, however, occur
with the peculiarity that, in these circumstances, the CJEU would be
interpreting judicial precedents of National Courts, in order to apply not
EU Law, but National Law.
Without casting shadows on the alleged infallibility of the CJEU, getting
to know and understand a foreign legal system is always a complex
exercise. Due to the extremely high level of knowledge of the judges sitting
in Luxembourg, one may imagine that, most of the time, the exercise
carried forward by the Court will produce results perfectly in line with the
position that National Courts would have reached. However, at least
theoretically, one cannot exclude that the CJEU might get it wrong and
end up with a decision that National Courts would not have followed. It
should be pointed out that, in resorting to Article 4(3), the CJEU is
applying National legislation, which results as implementation of EU
Directives, but does not apply EU Legislation itself.197 There are therefore
margins of interpretation that simply depend upon National Law and
require a proper understanding of the National Law.198 Those margins
naturally become wider when Directives leave significant autonomy to
Member States and may also vary depending on the solution that one
reaches in terms of how the CJEU should effectively consider National
Law, as explained, but nonetheless the margins cannot be eliminated. The

to Article 4(3), should be considered as a mere factual element. The answer to this question
should be negative, as the CJEU enjoys full and complete jurisdiction in applying National
Law that cannot be reduced to a mere factual element. See id. at ¶ 88.
196. See id. at ¶¶ 92–93.
197. THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, https://curia.europa.eu/
jcms/jcms/j_6/en/ (last visited Sept. 2, 2021) [https://perma.cc/EXW9-MR7W].
198. Id.
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decision of the CJEU might, therefore, be questionable because of the
difficulties in solving these issues. However, no redress might be available
in front of National Courts with the CJEU being the exclusive judge of
the matter, and because the decision of the Court of Luxembourg would
be definite and ultimate. Constructive dialogue, therefore, becomes essential
in the context of Article 4(3) to avoid ultimate fractures between EU and
National levels that might prove difficult, if not impossible, to compose.
In the context of the application of Article 4(3) of the SSMR, dialogue
between Courts does not necessarily stop when the CJEU adopts its own
decision. Should a similar case arise in front of National Courts after the
decision of the CJEU Court, the complexities embedded in Article 4(3) of
the SSMR raise unprecedented issues. On one hand, there would be
a precedent of the CJEU applying and interpreting a certain provision of
National Law under Article 4(3); on the other hand, National Courts might
need to apply that same provision in a similar case. For example, this
peculiar situation might occur if a less-significant credit institution challenges,
in front of domestic Courts, a decision made by its own NCA199 on the
basis of a provision of National Law that, if applied to a significant
institution, would instead be applied by the ECB and consequently reviewed
by the CJEU. Divergences should, most of the time, narrow down because
the National Law relevant for the purpose of Article 4(3) is that which
results from the implementation of EU Directives; this should prevent
some, if not most, risk of misalignment. There may, however, be situation
when the divergence between the CJEU and the National Court does not
depend upon a different interpretation or application of the corresponding
EU Directive, but upon matters left to National Legislation which are

199. A simple example might clarify this statement. Reference can be made to the
fit and proper requirements for the management of credit institutions. For significant credit
institutions, this is an exclusive competence of the ECB; it would therefore be the latter
that applies National Legislation implementing EU Directives (CRD IV). For less significant
credit institutions, NCAs would instead be competent, and National Courts would be competent
in reviewing their decisions. Due to the complexities associated with the interpretation and
application of those requirements, there might well be divergences between the approach
taken, in a similar case, by the CJEU (in relation to a case raised by a significant credit
institution in front of the Court), or by National Courts is a case raised by a less-significant
institution. Naturally, these differences and risks of divergences disappear when the
ECB has exclusive competence in a certain matter regardless of the relevance of the credit
institution. For example, in assessing the requirements for qualified shareholders, as extensively
discussed in the Berlusconi case.
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relevant for the solution of a certain controversy.200 If the divergence
between the CJEU and National Courts only concerns National Law, and
does not imply any contrast as to the interpretation of EU Law, National
Courts should be free to apply and interpret National Law in their own
way, thus disregarding the decision of the CJEU. In these circumstances,
if a similar case later arises in another Member State, the Courts of the
Member States may even try to reject the CJEU’s interpretation by arguing
that the interpretation given must be distinguished, as driven by merely
domestic law considerations. Notwithstanding the above, it might be difficult
to ascertain whether what is being effectively applied and interpreted is
merely National Law, or EU Law, or a combination of the two.201 In most
of these scenarios, multiple types of exchanges and discourses among
courts might indeed develop (not necessarily involving Constitutional or
High-Level Courts), including those between National Courts of different
Member States.
IV. SOME PROVISIONAL CONCLUSIONS. FROM PRELIMINARY
REFERENCE TO OTHER FORMS OF DIALOGUE:
A FIRST BALANCE
Preliminary reference has gradually become an important way to develop
formal dialogue among Constitutional Courts and the CJEU.202 EU Banking

200. Once again, a good example of this might be the maze of the fit-and-proper
requirements for members of the managing body of credit institutions. Since CRD IV
leaves a lot of discretion to Member States in implementing its provisions, National
legislations implementing the Directive might diverge significantly. The ECB might
therefore need to apply a certain provision of National Law that is perfectly aligned with
the Directive, but that the ECB wrongly interprets based on National Law. If the decision
of the ECB is challenged in front of the CJEU, the CJEU should apply National Law.
However, there might be divergences with National Courts insofar as its interpretation
according to National Rules or criteria. These divergences would not affect the interpretation
or application of EU Law.
201. On this point, the similar issues arising in the context of international law
when domestic courts try to refer to the interpretation of international law by courts of other
States. Cf. Tzanakopoulos, supra note 170, at 43.
202. VAN GESTEL & DE POORTOER, COOPERATION, COORDINATION AND COLLABORATION
BETWEEN THE ECJ AND SUPREME ADMINISTRATIVE COURTS (2019). The Authors conclude, at
the end of their extensive research, that preliminary reference is far from being a true
dialogue because the CJEU is not prepared: (a) to share power and responsibility with
supreme administrative courts with regard to decisions concerning the validity and correct
interpretation of EU Law; (b) to enable National Courts to talk back at the Court to inform
it about the consequences of possible preliminary rulings for the national legal order; (c)
to show accountability towards National Courts regarding the way in which it has taken
into account their views of how EU Law should be interpreted, applied and enforced. The
Authors, however, acknowledge that the Court devotes extensive efforts in other forms of
informal dialogue outside the preliminary reference procedure.
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legislation has become a fertile ground for these developments, providing
new insights as to the outcome of the procedure its impact on judicial
dialogue. As Gauweiler and Weiss clearly show, preliminary reference is
not the cure for all diseases; it has advantages and disadvantages. 203
Certain shortfalls of the procedure, and possible areas of improvement,
had been repeatedly singled out before Gauweiler and Weiss in other areas
of EU Law; some of these elements have been previously sketched out.
To further understand the preliminary reference in a new context, it is beneficial
to draw some general remarks regarding the recent developments in the
context of EU Banking Legislation.
There are several advantages of trying to develop judicial dialogue by
way of preliminary reference including its simplicity and directness. For
example, National Courts define the perimeter and scope of the question
for the CJEU and procedural prerequisites are fairly easy to satisfy: there
are no particular procedural conditions that must be complied to and the
referring body must be classified as a Court or Tribunal. 204 Substantial
requisites are also quite easy to comply with: the question raised before
the Court must be related to the facts pending before the national court, it
should not be merely hypothetical, and the CJEU should be provided with
sufficient material to be able to provide a “useful answer.”205 At a broader
level, beyond Constitutional Courts, access to preliminary reference is
also open to lower Courts with no limitation as to the scope of the question;
lower Courts may also refer to the CJEU questions that have an impact
on, or are related to, internal Constitutional Law. 206 This is a positive

203. On the different approaches that National Courts take in the context of the
preliminary ruling procedure, see Karin Leijon, National Courts and Preliminary Reference:
Supporting Legal Integration, Protecting National Autonomy or Balancing Conflicting
Demands? 44 W. EUR. POL. 510 (2020).
204. Jacobien van Dorp & Pauline Phoa, National Courts and Preliminarty References:
Supporting Legal Integration, Protecting National Autonomy or Balancing Conflicting
Demands?, UTRECHT J. OF INT’L AND EUR. L. (Aug. 6, 2018), https://utrechtjournal.org/
articles/10.5334/ujiel.455/ [https://perma.cc/KNW7-BBUZ].
205. On the basis of the long-standing case law of the CJEU from Simmenthal (Case
C-106/77, Amm. delle finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal, 1978 E.C.R 106/77); later confirmed
in Mecanarte (Case C-348/89, Mecanarte - Metalúrgica da Lagoa Ldª v. Chefe do Serviço
da Conferência Final da Alfândega do Porto, 1991 E.C.R I-03277), and restated in Melki and
Abdeli (Joined cases C-188/10 and C-189/10, Aziz Melki and Sélim Abdeli, 2010 E.C.R
363). Domestic courts may refer preliminary references to the CJEU at any step throughout
the proceedings.
206. CONSOLIDATED VERSION OF THE TREATY OF THE FUNCTIONING OF THE EUROPEAN
UNION art. 267, July 7, 2016, 2016 O.J. (C 201) 1.
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feature of preliminary reference, but it also has some drawbacks if one
considers that NCCs cannot intervene in the relative judgment in front of
the CJEU, nor can they play the role of amicus curiae.207 The result is that
important constitutional issues may be discussed by the CJEU without
NCCs playing any role or having their say in the matter. Notwithstanding
the fact that the CJEU is usually well informed on the position of NCCs,
informal dialogue might ultimately need to develop.
One of the most evident limits of preliminary reference is that it gives
way to a somehow limited form of dialogue which is not a true “dialogue,”
a concept that would require at least some on-going form of interlocution.208
After NCCs raise their question(s) to the CJEU, they cannot intervene before
the CJEU, suggest possible answers, and cannot formally intervene, even
when Constitutional issues are at stake.209 At this stage, there is only space
for informal dialogues; that National governments may intervene in front
of the CJEU is not a sufficient surrogate. The effects of these limits may
become more evident after the decision; the judgment of the CJEU should
be implemented in the National system in compliance with the principle
of sincere cooperation. Weiss II clearly shows how hazardous this “black
or white” situation can become; this is precisely why Weiss II is so instructive.210
The issue in Weiss II was linked to lack of sufficient evidence and statement
of reason; one might therefore wonder whether the outcome of the case
would have been the same if there had been the chance for the BVerfG to
develop and discuss its arguments in front of the Court through a truly
dialogical confrontation. Some proposals for a possible reform of the
preliminary judgement procedure indeed point in this direction.211 Despite
its flaws, Weiss II is significant because the judgment of the BVerfG tried
to repair, albeit a bit too roughly, what it thought had been broken. This
might explain why the court ultimately “orders” the ECB to provide additional
clarification on its internal assessment.212 While the atypical contents of
this order may not be seriously questioned, it clearly reflects a lack of
sufficient dialogue. Interaction did not sufficiently develop among the
207. No 0 1/05, Judgment, ¶ 2 (Trybunal konstytucyjny Apr. 27, 2005).
208. Claes & de Visser supra note 7, at 100; The Legitimacy of Judicial Review:
The Limits of Dialogue between Courts and Legislature, 3 INT’L. J CONST. L. 617 (2005)
(elaborating on Luc B. Tremblay).
209. EAST AFRICAN COMMUNITY LAW: INSTITUTIONAL, SUBSTANTIVE AND COMPARATIVE
EU ASPECTS (Emmanuel Ugirashebuja et al. eds., 2017).
210. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVERFG] [Federal Constitutional Court] May 5,
2020, 1, 90 (Ger.), https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/
EN/2020/05/rs20200505_2bvr085915en.html [https://perma.cc/A5NK-UAHE].
211. VAN GESTEL & DE POORTOER, supra note 202.
212. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVERFG] [Federal Constitutional Court] May 5,
2020, 1, 85-91 (Ger.), https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/
EN/2020/05/rs20200505_2bvr085915en.html [https://perma.cc/A5NK-UAHE].
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courts, and a dangerous escalation took place. Insufficient dialogue turned
into a row, and the issue in Weiss became violation of ultra vires, conferral,
proportionality, and counter-limits.213 As in a family row, old tensions
came back to the surface, and the storm in a teacup turned into a tsunami.
Another limitation of preliminary references is that they may be a
double-edged sword, especially when used by a NCC. When reverting to
it, the National Court must, at least in principle, fully recognize and accept
its mechanism and thereby be ready to abide by the principle of the
superior value of the CJEU’s judgment.214 If it does not do so, as the
BverfG did in Weiss II, the referring Court would breach the rules of the
games that it is playing and thus place itself outside the game itself.215 A
further weak spot of the procedure is that National Courts are not obliged
to, nor do they always willingly, notify the CJEU about the decision made
internally after the preliminary judgement. While this may be considered
simply laziness, it might also hide the fact that National Courts are not
always willing to openly show that they do not fully align their position
to that of the CJEU, or rather disregard them. This is also a weak point
embedded in Article 4(3) of the SSMR, as application of National Law by
the CJEU on one side and by National Courts on the other may give rise
to a divergent and uncoordinated body of jurisprudence.216
However, there are margins of flexibility in the preliminary reference
procedure that could be used more extensively. For example, considering
the case of preliminary references by lower Courts, if the CJEU reaches a

213. Weiss II does not automatically imply a conflict between the German and the
EU Legal orders, which include many other institutions besides their Superior Courts. This
profile was already caught by two authors who acknowledged that the interactions among
law-applying legal institutions in the European Union involve “dialogue” and “compromise”
between similarly situated, potentially conflicting legal institutions, not reference to
a chain of authority to determine which legal institution holds greater authority. See KEITH
CULVER & MICHAEL GIUDICE, LEGALITY’S BORDERS: AN ESSAY IN GENERAL JURISPRUDENCE
161 (2010).
214. Id.
215. See Franz C. Mayer, To Boldly Go Where No Court Has Gone Before. The
German Federal Constitutional Court’s ultra vires d\Decision of May 5, 2020, 21 GER.
L.J. 1116, 1125 (2020), [https://perma.cc/K89N-LDKX] (rightly observing that in the
decision it was the BVerfG itself that ultimately proved to be ultra vires, by violating
Articles 267(3) and 19 of the TEU.
216. Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 Conferring Specific
Tasks on the European Central Bank Concerning Policies Relating to the Prudential
Supervision of Credit Institutions, ch. 1, art. 4, ¶ 3, Oct. 15, 2013, 2016 O.J. (L 287/63),
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2013/1024/oj#d1e939-63-1 [https://perma.cc/6WFW-HMXV].
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conclusion that is at odds with National Constitutional principles, Article
267 of the TFEU does not exclude for further references, as seen in
Taricco II where a NCC raised a new preliminary question after the one
raised by another National Court. 217 Considering the Weiss saga, some
argue that the BVerfG might have raised a second preliminary ruling on
the judgment of the CJEU before declaring it inapplicable.218 It however
shows that, even within the same case, dialogue may be an on-going feature
and not a “one-off” tool; preliminary judgement might in fact turn out to
be less static than what might appear at first glance.219
What the Weiss case shows, however, is that the shortcomings of the
preliminary ruling procedure cannot be entirely solved solely by stressing
the authority of the CJEU’s judgments and by reaffirming the principle of
supremacy sculpted in cases such as Costa v/Enel220 and Simmenthal,221
but rather by improving dialogue and discourse.222 In this respect, EU
Banking Law may indeed become one of the many faces of what some
have called the “polemical” spirit of European Constitutional Law.223
A. Dialogue, Constitutional Pluralism, and the Future
Due to its degree of innovation and already high engagement with judicial
review and litigation, EU Banking Legislation is providing interesting
new developments that touch upon many aspects of European Law. It is
also offers food for thought at a broader, political level; it shows that
judicial discourse can effectively stimulate wider forms of dialogue. The
decision of the BVerfG in the Weiss case, while being fiercely criticized

217. C-42/17, Taricco and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2017:564 (July 18, 2017); Consolidated
version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 276, Sept. 9, 2008,
2008 O.J. (c 115) 164, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A1
2008E267 [https://perma.cc/RHN3-855C].
218. Sven & Rathke, supra note 126, at 955.
219. Sven & Rathke, supra note 126, at 955.
220. C-6/64, Flaminio Costa v. E.N.E.L., ECLI:EU:C:1964:66, 587-600 (July 15, 1964),
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A61964CJ0006 [https://
perma.cc/B6TK-JHMU].
221. C-106/77, Amministrazione delle Finanze Dello Stato v. Simmenthal SpA,
ECLI:EU:C:1978:49, 630–46 (Mar. 9, 1978), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/
TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A61977CJ0106 [https://perma.cc/B7B8-KZG5].
222. See Eleanor Sharpston, Transparency and Clear Legal Language in the European
Union: Ambiguous Legislative Texts, Laconic Pronouncements and the Credibility of the Judicial
System, 12 CAMBRIDGE Y.B. EUR LEGAL STUD. 409, 415 (2010); Arnull, supra note 7, at
132.
223. Giuseppe Martinico, The “Polemical” Spirit of European Constitutional Law:
On the Importance of Conflicts in EU Law, 16 GER. L. REV. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 1343 (2015).
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by many,224 has been hailed by others, especially from those countries of
the eastern bloc that are currently looked upon as champions of
authoritarianism. 225 For the critics, the case might also show that
Constitutional pluralism,226 a value that has long been singled out as a
salient feature of the EU legal order fostering democracy and pluralism,
might slip out of its own hands leaving space for reaffirming National
primacy over EU Law. This danger becomes concrete if one reasons in
terms of the juxtaposition between the EU and the National legal orders.
However, Constitutional pluralism should continue to be one of the core
values of the Union and should serve as a common basis for the development
and re-affirmation of fundamental, common values between the Member
States.227 Constitutional pluralism should therefore be understood as an
open area for dialogue and confrontation between the multiple and different
legal traditions that contribute to the backbone of the Union which represents
its uniqueness in its diversity.228
The decision of the BVerfG in Weiss II may become an opportunity for
further developments. For example, it might serve to stimulate the CJEU
to conduct a more in-depth review of the decisions of the ECB229 without
224. The decision also sparked some collective commentaries, where multiple jurists
joined forces in their disappointments. See, e.g., R. Daniel Kelemen et al., National
Courts Cannot Override CJEU Judgments: A Joint Statement in Defense of the EU Legal
Order, VERFASSUNGSBLOG (May 26, 2020), https://verfassungsblog.de/national-courtscannot-override-cjeu-judgments/ [https://perma.cc/QY6Z-86GL] (The decision also sparked
some collective commentaries, where multiple jurists joined forces in their disappointments).
225. On the PSPP and democracy in the EU, see Isabel Feichtner, The German Const.
Court’s PSPP Judgement: Impediment and Impetus for the Democratization of Eur., 21 GER.
L.J. 1090, 1094 (2020).
226. On constitutional pluralism within the European integration process, see generally
Neil MacCormik, Beyond the Sovereign State, 56 M OD. L. REV . 1, 9 (1993); N EIL
MACCORMIK, QUESTIONING SOVEREIGNTY: LAW, STATE, AND NATION IN THE EUROPEAN
COMMONWEALTH (1999); Miguel Poiares Maduro, Contrapunctual Law: Europe’s Constitutional
Pluralism in Action, in SOVEREIGNTY IN TRANSITION 501, 502 (Neil Walker ed., 2003).
227. See Miguel Poiares Maduro, Interpreting European Law: Judicial Adjudication in
a Context of Constitutional Pluralism, 1 EUR. J. LEGAL S TUD. 137 (2008) (Identifying
constitutional pluralism in the EU).
228. Matej Avbelj, Constitutional Pluralism and Authoritarianism, 21 GER. L.J. 1023
(2020).
229. According to some, the CJEU might learn a lesson from Weiss. Some authors
note that the case-law of the Court of Justice only sets a straightforward rule: in case of
doubt, the competence is of the EU to ensure the effet utile of EU Law, and the dialogue
stops there. This might be an approach that raises the concern of National Courts, especially
those that have a more “acute sense of federalism.” See Vlad Perju, Against Bidimensional
Supremacy in EU Constitutionalism, 21 GER. L.J. 1006 (2020).
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necessarily compromising its independence. It might serve as a stimulus
for improving certain rules of procedure, for imagining new institutional
arenas for judicial dialogue, or for wider reforms on substantive aspects
of EU Legislation. Going beyond technicalities of EU Banking Law, the
precedents that have been discussed may provide stimulus for broader
evolutions, initiating circuits for dialogue between the judiciary, the executive,
and the legislative.
Other case law similarly points in this direction. When the BVerfG
questioned the primacy of EU Law in the Solange saga, the “dialogue”
ultimately led to the improvement of the protection of human rights in the
EU.230 The criticism that the BVerfG moved to the Treaties of Maastricht
and Lisbon in terms of deficiency in democracy ultimately led to the
improvement of the democratic potential of the EU by building on the
potentials of EU citizenship, increased competences of the European
Parliament, and clearer prescriptions as to the exercise of the powers of EU
Institutions.231 Even the Danish Court, in its resistance against the CJEU
in the Ajos case,232 is pushing EU institutions to achieve a statutory legal
basis for the prohibition against discrimination on the ground of age.233
Another stimulus may come from the necessity to reconsider the structure
of the CJEU’s judgement. Well before Weiss, it was suggested that the
quality of the CJEU’s judgments, and the dialogue with National Courts,
might improve if dissenting opinions were permitted.234 In theory, this
would reduce the pressure on the CJEU to accommodate points of view
which are essentially irreconcilable within its judgments. However, the
prevailing opinion is that dissenting opinions would severely compromise
230. See Martinico, supra note 6.
231. Cf. Kent Roach, Constitutional and Common Law Dialogues Between the
Supreme Court and Canadian Legislatures, 80 CAN. B. REV. 481, 485 (2001). Roach identified
three types of what he calls “dialogic judicial review.” Under the first type, courts and
legislatures have an equal right to interpret rules of the constitution. The second type
emphasizes the ultimate accountability of the courts to legislatures and society. The third
type sees the courts and legislatures “playing distinctive yet complementary roles
in resolving questions that involve rights and freedoms.” Roach makes it clear that his
preference is for the third type. His rationale is based on the advantages claimed for a
dialogic model of judicial review. According to Roach, the third type of such review is
preferable because it can produce the most constructive partnership between courts and
legislatures. See also Jeremy Waldron, Some Models of Dialogue Between Judges and
Legislators, 23 SUP. CT. L. REV. (2d) 7 (2004).
232. C-441/14, Dansk Industri (DI), acting on behalf of Ajos A/S v. Estate of Karsten
Eigil Rasmussen, ECLI:EU:C:2016:278 [hereinafter Ajos].
233. The Czech Landtova decision seems instead to be, at the moment, immune from this
capacity to support positive development, likely due to its national particularity. See
Avbelj, supra note 228, at 1023; see also Tridimas, supra note 5, at 418.
234. See Arnull, supra note 7, at 132–33 (provides examples of suggestions, reinterpreted in the light of Weiss II).
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the secrecy of the CJEU’s deliberations and might encourage judges to
dissent for political reasons. 235 In references for preliminary rulings,
dissenting opinions might also compromise the clarity of the CJEU’s
answers to the questions referred to it. Other suggestions point instead at
the style in which judgments of the CJEU are written, as they were originally
modelled on those of the French Conseil d’Etat and Cour de Cassation,
leaving virtually no space for extensive interpretive or policy analysis.236
The Court’s judgments may also be difficult to understand by non-specialists
and may look self-referential.237
Furthermore, the Landeskreditbank and the Banking Union cases may
provide useful contributions in this direction by indicating new forms of
dialogue among Courts. These cases also provide useful contributions by
setting out and clarifying the standards for the future development of
legislation in that area (i.e., compliance with the principle of proportionality).238
The cases might even support the idea of considering, in the future, to
upgrade the topic of Banking supervision and legislation among those that
are in the exclusive competence of the Union, rather than leaving them
simply within the scope of Article 114 of the TFUE.239 Those decisions
also show how far the dialogue can stretch before turning into confrontation
if the doors are kept, so-to-say, open. In the Banking Union decision, it
was the BVerfG that prompted an alternative, corrective reading of the
decision of the CJEU in a clear attempt to avoid open dissent.240 In other
cases, such as Gauweiler, it might instead be the CJEU that disseminates,
within its judgements, one or more “hooks” that the National Court may
pick up and develop to keep the dialogue open and adjust its interpretation
of National Constitutional Law.241
Additionally, in relation to the developments in EU-Banking Law related
jurisprudence, the importance of dialogue goes well beyond the relationship
between Courts. If there is an objective limit in the Weiss case, then this
is insufficient dialogue at all levels including that of, or with, the ECB.
235. See Arnull, supra note 7, at 132–33.
236. See Arnull, supra note 7, at 132–33.
237. See Arnull, supra note 7, at 132–33.
238. See Case C-450/17, Landeskreditbank Baden-Württemberg v. ECB, ECLI:EU:C:
2019:372 (May 8, 2019).
239. Id.
240. See Pierre Schammo, Institutional Change in the Banking Union: The Case of
the Single Supervisory Mechanism, YEARBOOK OF EUR. L. (Apr. 21, 2021).
241. Case C-62/14, Gauweiler and others v. Deutscher Bundestag, ECLI:EU:C:
2015:400, ¶ 127 (June 16, 2016).
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Because the core of the case was insufficient statement of reason and of
its review by the CJEU, Weiss clearly provides a key to avoid similar
incidents in the future.242 Ultimately, the solution to Weiss II cannot
simply be reinstating the supremacy of the jurisprudence of the CJEU and
the autonomy and discretion of the ECB’s action in the field of monetary
policy. While supremacy is not questioned, it is becoming evident that
dialogue is essential to prevent that principle from coming at odds with
the Legal systems of core countries within the EU. As to the ECB, its
independence in pursuing its mandate in the field of monetary policy is
not being questioned, as it is directly enshrined in the Treaty. However,
the unclear boundary between monetary and economic policy and the
imperfect institutional foundation of the ECB’s powers in the field of
Banking Supervision produced a potentially explosive mixture. This
mixture would be better kept under control if adequate intelligibility,
transparency, and accountability are constantly achieved and complied
with. Notwithstanding that no reasonable party is willing to challenge the
fundamental values and mission of the ECB, there remains the fact that
the ECB’s determinations must be, at all times, sufficiently transparent
and “readable” from outside. It is a delicate equilibrium to be achieved as
it calls into question the issue of finding the appropriate level of external
review and accountability acceptable in relation to the ECB. Ultimately,
the role of the ECB might be reinforced by a more open discursive
dialogue, as this would deprive its critics of their own arguments 243 and
would prevent the unbearable risk of rendering the ECB and, more
generally, EU Institutions into giants with feet of clay (i.e., institutions
whose decisions, in very sensitive areas, may be easily challenged). One
of the few virtues of Weiss points in this direction.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The high degree of innovation and experimentation of EU Banking Law
is a fruitful laboratory for the development of forms of judicial dialogue
that go well beyond preliminary reference. Different kinds of dialogue are
concretely in place, some of which have already been applied in other
areas of EU Legislation; other forms of dialogue are more innovative, and
others are unprecedented. The evolution of the rapidly expanding body of
case law in this field offers a privileged point of observation of the
fascinating, controversial topic of judicial dialogue in the European Union.
242. Case C-493/17, Weiss and Others v. Bundesregierung, ECLI:EU:C:2018:1000,
¶ 16 (Dec. 11, 2018).
243. See Mattias Wendel, Paradoxes of Ultra-Vires Review: A Critical Review of the
PSPP Decision and Its Initial Reception, 21 GER. L.J. 979 (2020).
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Recent case law shows signs of formal, constructive, open dialogues,
where courts struggle to cut edges and converge on common grounds,
such as in Gauweiler. There are cases where the dialogue stops and
misunderstandings escalate into issues larger than anyone can handle, as
seen in Weiss. There are cases where informal, parallel dialogues are being
conducted, leading to corrective re-readings of other Court’s decisions,
such as in Landeskreditbank and Banking Union. There are cases where
one is faced with the blunt, non-critical incorporation of another Court’s
decision, that would otherwise not be formally binding, as seen in Crédit
Agricole.
Future developments in areas such as Article 4(3) of the SSMR can only
be envisioned today, but it is certain that reality will be able to transcend
imagination. In regard to EU Banking Legislation, the preliminary reference
procedure initiated by NCCs is far from ruling out other forms of judicial
dialogue, including informal and hidden ones, some of which are
unprecedented. 244 After all, EU Law has always been a huge, immense
laboratory for innovation, and, thanks to this, the EU edifice has survived
immense difficulties to progress and evolve, against all odds.

244. The concerns set out in this respect by some Authors have therefore proven to
be unfounded. See GIUSEPPE M ARTINICO , L’ I NTEGRAZIONE S ILENTE : LA F UNZIONE
INTERPRETATIVA DELLA CORTE DI GIUSTIZIA E IL DIRITTO COSTITUZIONALE EUROPEO 221
(2008).
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